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A REALISTIC CONSENSUS APPROACH TO THE
INSURANCE LAW DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE
EXPECTATIONS

Peter Nash Swisher

I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past thirty years, a great number of articles have analyzed, questioned, and debated Professor (now Judge) Robert E. Keeton's doctrine of
reasonable expectations as applied to insurance coverage disputes.'
1. The modem insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations was largely developed
by Professor Robert E. Keeton in 1970. See Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rightsat Variance
with Policy Provisions(Parts I and H), 83 HIA-v. L. REv. 961 (1970) and 83 HAuv. L. Ray. 1281
(1970) [hereinafter Insurance Law Rights]; see also Robert E. Keeton, Reasonable Expectationsin
the Second Decade, 12 FORUM 275 (1976); ROBERT E. KEETON AND ALAN WIDISS, INsuANcE
LAw §§ 6.01-6.10 (1988). Since 1970, Professor Keeton's groundbreaking doctrine of reasonable expectations has received widely mixed support and criticism from a number of American courts and commentators. See generally Kenneth S. Abraham,judge-Made Law andJudgeMade Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectationsof the Insured, 67 VA. L. Rv. 1151 (1981)
[hereinafter Judge-MadeLaw]; Kenneth S. Abraham, The Expectations Principleas a Regulative
Ideal, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 59 (1998-1999) [hereinafter A Regulative Ideal]; Arnold P. Anderson,
Life Insurance ConditionalReceipts andJudicialIntervention, 63 MARQ. L. REv. 593 (1980); Eugene R. Anderson and JamesJ. Fournier, Why CourtsEnforce Insurance Policyholders' Objectively
Reasonable Expectations of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335 (1998-1999); Gary L.
Birnbaum, Standardized Agreements and the Parole Evidence Rule: Defining and Applying the
ErpectationsPrinciple, 26 Asiz. L. Rav. 793 (1984); H. Walter Croskey, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in California: A Judge's View, 5 CONN. INS. LJ. 451 (1998-1999); Amy
Cubbage, The Interaction of the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations and Ambiguity in Drafting:
The Development of the Kentucky Formulation, 85 Ky. L.J. 435 (1997); Douglas Fadel, Utah
Rejects the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine in Insurance Contract Interpretation, 1993 UTAH L.
Rrv. 275 (1993); Laurie Kindell Fett, The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine: An Alternative to
Bending and Stretching TraditionalRules of Contract Interpretation, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. Rv.
1113 (1992); James M. Fischer, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations Is Indispensable, If Only
We Knew Wbat For?, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 151 (1998-1999); Frank Gardner, Reasonable Expectations: Evolution Completed or Revolution Begun?, 669 INs. L.J. 573 (1978); David Goodhue,
The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Massachusetts and New Hampshire: A Comparative
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With such a wealth of authority discussing the doctrine, one might question the need for yet another analysis of this elusive and troublesome subAnalysis, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 891 (1991); Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations in Insurance Law After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823 (1990) [hereinafter
ReasonableExpectationsAfter Two Decades];Roger C. Henderson, The Formulation of the Doctrine
ofReasonable Expectations and the Influence ofForces Outside Insurance Law, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 69
(1998-1999) [hereinafter Forces Outside Insurance Law]; Kenneth J. Homer Jr., InsuranceContracts-TheAmbiguity in the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
423 (1986); John Dwight Ingram, The Insured's Expectations Should Be Honored Only If They
Are Reasonable, 23 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 813 (1997); Robert H. Jerry II, Insurance, Contract,
and the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 5 CoNN. INS. LJ. 21 (1998-1999) [hereinafter
Insurance, Contract,and Doctrine];Martin Kamarck, Opening the Gate: The Steven Case and the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 153 (1977-1978); Starr Kelso, Idaho and
the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations: A Springboardfor an Analysis of a New Approach to a
Valuable But Often MisunderstoodDoctrine, 47 INs. COUNSELJ. 325 (1980); William Mark Lashner, A Common Law Alternative to the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1175 (1982); David Leitner, Enforcing the Customers' "Reasonable Expectations" in Interpreting

InsuranceContracts:A Doctrinein Search ofCoherent Definition, 38 FED'N INS. AND

CORP. Corms.

Q. 379 (1988); Diane Lucas, Decapitationto Cure Dandruff.? The Scope of the ReasonableExpectations Doctrine of Darner Motor Sales Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 20 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 841 (1988); William A. Mayhew, Reasonable Expectations: Seeking a PrincipledApplication,
13 PEPFERDINE L. REV. 267 (1986); Jeffrey Pawelski, InsurersDon't Need the Courtsto "Babysit"
Them: An Argumentfor Reasonable Expectations in American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Elliot,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 375 (1996); Harry Perlet III, The Insurance Contract and the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 6 FORUM 116 (1970); Susan M. Popik and Carol D. Quackenbos,
Reasonable Expectations After Thirty Years: A Failed Doctrine, 5 CONN. INs. L.J. 425 (19981999); Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L. REv. 323 (1986);
Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, 5 CoN. INs. L.J. 107 (1998-1999); W
Wylie Spicer, Ch-Ch-Changes: Stumbling Toward the Reasonable Expectations of the Assured in
Marine Insurance, 66 TULANE L. REV. 457 (1991); Conrad Squires, A Skeptical Look at the
Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 6 FORUM 252 (1971); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Unmet Expectations: Undue Restriction of the Reasonable ExpectationsApproach and the Misleading Mythology of
the Judicial Role, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 181 (1998-1999) [hereinafter Unmet Expectations]; Scott
C. Sterling, Reasonable Expectations ofInsurance Coverage and the Problem of EnvironmentalLiabilities, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 395 (1990); Jeffrey E. Thomas, An InterdisciplinaryCritique of the
Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INs. L.J. 295 (1998-1999); Stephen J. Ware, A
Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1461 (1989); Note, Interpreting the Business Pursuits Exclusion in Homeowner's Policies-TowardHonoring "Reasonable
Expectations," 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 132 (1980); Note, Reasonable Expectations Approach to
Insurance ContractInterpretationModified in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REv. 577 (1982); Comment,
A Reasonable Approach to the Doctrineof Reasonable Expectationsas Applied to Insurance Contracts,
13 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 603 (1980); Comment, Insurer Liability in the Asbestos Disease Context-Application of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 239 (1982);
Comment, Reasonable Expectations: The Insurer'sDilemma, 24 DAt L. REv. 853 (1975); Comment, The Reconstruction ofInsurance Contracts Underthe Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, 18
J. MARSHALL L" REv. 155 (1984).
Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations also has received attention in a

number of practice-oriented insurance law treatises. See, e.g., EUGENE ANDERSON, INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION §§ 2.1-2.15 (1997); ROBERTJERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW
§ 25D (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW]; BARRY OSTRAGER AND
THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES § 10.03 (9th ed. 1998);
JEFFREY W STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 4.09 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES]; ALLAN WINDT, INSURANCE CLAIMS AND DisPUTES § 6.03 (3d ed. 1995).

It is surprising, therefore, that two widely respected multivolume insurance law treatises,
over the past

APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW and COUCH'S CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW,
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ject.2 But if there is a practical way to better understand this interpretive
conundrum, such an analysis might assist academic scholars, jurists, and
insurance law practitioners alike.'
This article's fundamental premise is that, over the past three decades,
despite all the debate and confusion surrounding the underlying theory
and practice of the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations, a
modem consensus approach has finally emerged within the academic community and the courts and among insurance law practitioners 4 involving a
realistic and viable application of the doctrine to the needs of contemporary
thirty years have given little recognition to Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations. For example, the most recent edition of the Couch treatise still discusses the doctrine
of reasonable expectations only as a contractually based concept. See LEE Russ AND THOMAS
SEGALLA, COUCH'S CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW §§ 21:11-15 and 22:11 (3d ed. 1997)
[hereinafter COUCH'S CYCLOPEDIA]; see also ERIC HOLMES AND MARK RHODES, HOLMES' ApPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW §§ 5.1-5.8 and 8.1 (2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HOLMES' APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE LAW]. Professor Holmes does refer to Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations in his 1996 treatise revision, id. at 289, but he concludes that: " ... the
classical formal judicial process of the interpretation and construction of [insurance] contracts
is most familiar. The written contract is presumed to represent the parties' intent and mutual
assent on all matters and create the law of their contract. The function of the court is not to
rewrite their bargained for language, but rather is to interpret their language according to its
plain, common-sense meaning ... " Id. at 291. Thus, Professor Holmes arguably still applies
a more traditional contractually based insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations to
insurance coverage disputes. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, this traditional contractually based objective reasonable expectations approach is still a practical, viable, and
theoretically sound interpretive approach to insurance coverage disputes.
2. See, e.g., Bensalem Township v. International Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 38 E3d 1303, 1311
(3d Cir. 1994) ("Since Professor Keeton's article, a considerable number of trees have been
sacrificed in the name of reasonable expectations as the academic community has debated
what reasonable expectations means, which courts have adopted the doctrine, and whether it
is desirable for them to have done so.").
3. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987,
100 HARv. L. REv. 761, 777 (1987) ("Disinterested legal doctrinal analysis of the traditional
kind remains the indispensable core of legal thought, and there is no surfeit of such analysis
today. I daresay that many legal scholars who today are breathing the heady fumes of deconstruction, structuralism, moral philosophy, and the theory of second best would be better
employed... synthesizing the law of insurance."). Admittedly, this synthesis of the insurance
law doctrine of reasonable expectations represents a pragmatic attempt to find common
ground among the various supporters and critics of Professor Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine. My colleague, Professor Jeffrey Stempel, on the other hand, has analyzed the
Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine in terms of the Hegelian progression of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. Stempel, Unmet Expectations,supra note 1, at 248-50. The philosopher
George Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel appears to be enjoying a modern renaissance of sorts. See,
e.g., Chad McCracken, Hegel and the Autonomy of Contract Law, 77 TEx. L. REv. 719 (1999).
4. Such a doctrine must have a sound theoretical basis and a practical application in order
to meet the needs and concerns of both academic lawyers and practicing lawyers in an insurance law context. For a discussion of the historical conflicts and tensions between practicing
lawyers and academic lawyers generally, see W JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN
THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES (1978). One commentator has observed, for example,
that Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations "has held particular attraction to

academics, while simultaneously prompting resistance from elements of the bench and bar,
and particularly from the insurance industry." Jeffrey W Stempel, Unreason in Action: A Case
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American society. This consensus approach constitutes a practical "middle
ground" synthesis of traditional, objective, and contractually based reasonable expectations principles grafted onto elements of the more modem
Keeton formulation of the doctrine. Moreover, this realistic consensus approach to the doctrine of reasonable expectations is both theoretically and
practically defensible since, as I have argued in two previous articles,, contemporary legal rules of insurance contract interpretation must be both
6
theoretically sound and have practical application.
To quote an oft-cited axiom of early entertainment moguls: "Great idea!
But will it play in Peoria?" 7 Arguably, this realistic consensus approach to
the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations does indeed play
equally well in Los Angeles, Peoria, Cleveland, Dallas, Miami, New York,
and most other American cities and towns. The remainder of this article

Study of the WrongApproach to Construingthe Liability Insurance PollutionExclusion, 50 FlA. L.
REv. 463, 464-65 (1998). Arguably, a "middle ground" consensus approach to the doctrine
of reasonable expectations, as discussed below, would alleviate much of this conflict and tension within the legal community regarding insurance contract interpretation. See also note 6,
infra, and accompanying text.
5. See Peter Nash Swisher, Judicial Rationalesin Insurance Law: Dusting Off the Formalfor
the Function, 52 OHIo ST. L.J. 1037 (1991) [hereinafter J'udicialRationales in Insurance Law];
Peter Nash Swisher, JudicialInterpretationsof Insurance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic
Middle Ground Approach, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 543 (1996) [hereinafter A Middle GroundApproach
to Insurance ContractDisputes].
6. Judge Harry T Edwards is a strong proponent of such "practical" legal scholarship:
The growing disjunction between legal education and legal practice is most salient with
respect to scholarship. There has been a clear decline in the volume of "practical" scholarship published by law professors. "Practical" legal scholarship, in the broadest sense,
has several defining features. It is prescriptive: it analyzes the law and the legal system
with an aim to instruct attorneys in their consideration of legal problems, to guide judges
and other decision makers in their resolution of legal disputes, and to advise legislators
and other policymakers on law reform. It is also doctrinal:it attends to the various sources
of law (precedents, statutes, constitutions) that constrain or otherwise guide the practitioner, decision maker, and policymaker.... There are too few books, treatises, and law
review articles now that usefully "chart the line of development and progress" for judges
and other governmental decision makers....
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,
91 MicH. L. REv. 34, 42 -43 (1992). For a reply to Judge Edwards's criticism of current legal
scholarship, see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Mad Midwifery: Bringing Theory, Doctrine, and
Practice to Life, 91 MICH. L. Rav. 1977, 1997 (1993):
[Ihe disease of disjunction between legal education and the profession is not caused by
too much theory or too little doctrine and practice, but by too little attention to their
essential interplay in a complex and interconnected world. The cure I prescribe is not
further polarization but a more thoughtful integration not only of theory, doctrine, and
practice in the classroom, but of the complementary roles of scholar, teacher, and lawyer
in ourselves and in our understanding of each other.
Id.
7. Significantly, the Keeton insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations has not
played well in Peoria. See, e.g., Edward Collins, Insurance ContractInterpretation:The Doctrine
of Reasonable ExpectationsHas No Place in Illinois, 1985 S.IL.. U. LJ.687 (1985).
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will analyze, discuss, and demonstrate the viability and practicality of this
realistic consensus approach to the insurance law doctrine of reasonable
expectations.
II. WHAT EXACTLY IS THE INSURANCE LAW DOCTRINE OF
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS?

A majority of commentators and courts that have addressed and debated
the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations over the past three
decades have focused on the seminal writings of Professor Keeton in 1970.8
The impact of his influential article on the body of American insurance
law in general, and on insurance contract interpretation in particular, has
been profound. 9 As propounded by Professor Keeton, this "modem" doctrine of reasonable expectations is based upon a two-pronged rationale: (1)
that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance contract; and (2) that the reasonable expectations of the insurance
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts should be honored, even though a painstaking study of the policy
provisions contractually would have negated those expectations. 0 Although few courts or commentators today question the merits of Professor
Keeton's first doctrinal principle," there has been a firestorm of criticism
over his second principle. 2 Under this "modem" reasonable expectation
formula, the insurance policy need not be interpreted according to its clear
and unambiguous contract language-which is anathema to a classical formalistic theory of insurance contract interpretation:
The Keeton formula suggests that an insured can have reasonable expectations
of coverage that arise from some source other than the policy language itself,
and that such an extrinsic expectation can be powerful enough to override any
policy provisions no matter how clear. So interpreted, the Keeton formula
pushes insurance law in a dramatic new direction, one that discards the traditional contract premise that a written agreement is the controlling code for
determining the parties' rights and duties."
8. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights, supra note 1.
9. See, e.g.,Jerry,Insurance, Contract,and Doctrine,supra note 1, at 22 ("Legal rules, somewhat like laws of science, await discovery by explorers whose prescience enables them to
understand something others observed but could not comprehend... .In the field of insurance
law, Judge Robert Keeton is one of the grander explorers of them all."); Henderson, supra
note 1, at 70 (describing Professor Keeton as a "gifted legal astrologer in the galaxy of insurance law").
10. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Rights, supra note 1, at 963-64.
11. See generally infra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Fadel, supra note 1; Ingram, supra note 1; Lashner, supra note 1; Popik and
Quackenbos, supra note 1; Squires, supra note 1; Ware, supra note 1.
13. Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsReconsidered, supra note 1; see also Swisher, JudicialRationales in InsuranceLaw, supra note 5, at 1039-58.
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What many supporters and critics of Professor Keeton's doctrine of
reasonable expectations do not sufficiently appreciate, however, is how significantly this "modern" doctrine of reasonable expectations has evolved
from, and has been grafted onto, the depth and breadth of a more traditional contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations that a majority of courts and commentators can readily embrace, irrespective of
their formalistic' 4 or functionalistic 5 jurisprudential roots. For example,
Justice Benjamin Cardozo stated in his celebrated 1918 decision of Bird v.
St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance16 that "our guide is the reasonableexpectation and purpose of the ordinary businessman when making an ordinary
business contract. It is his intention, expressed or fairly to be inferred, that
counts ... "17

Other insurance law cases that predate Professor Keeton's 1970 reasonable expectations article employed this contractually based and objective
reasonable expectations doctrine in order to identify the terms of an insurance contract, to determine the scope of the parties' contractual duties
14. Legal formalism, also known as legal positivism, is the traditional view that correct
legal decisions are largely determined by preexisting judicial and legislative precedent, and
the law should be viewed as an autonomous system of logical, socially neutral principles and
rules. Judging under this formalistic theory is thus a matter of logical necessity rather than a
matter of choice. See, e.g., MARIO JOEi, LEGAL POSITIVISM (1992); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988) (discussing how legal formalism still serves a useful function in
limiting judicial discretion and judicial activism); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the
Imminent RationalityofLaw, 97 YALE L.J. 949 (1988) (questioning whether the law is essentially
rational as the formalists believe, or whether law is essentially political as the functionalists
believe); see also Swisher,JudicialRationales in Insurance Law, supra note 5, at 1039-42, 104850; Symposium, Formalism Revisited, 66 U. Cm. L. REV. 527-942 (1999).
15. Legal functionalism, also known as legal realism or legal pragmatism, is based on the
belief that the formalistic theory of a logical and socially neutral legal uniformity and predictability is rarely attainable and may be undesirable in a changing society, and the paramount
concern of the law should not be logical consistency, but socially desirable consequences.
Thus, where legal formalism is logically based and precedent-oriented, legal functionalism is
sociologically based and result-oriented. See, e.g., RoscoE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE (1959); WILIFRED RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM

(1968); G. AICHELE,

LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH

CENTURY AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE (1990); see also SwisherJudicialRationalesin Insurance Law,

supra note 5, at 1043-45, 1050-58. A third emerging school of American legal theory, the
critical legal studies movement, which calls for the dismantling of existing political and legal
institutions in favor of newly empowered forms of social democracy, has not yet made any
appreciable impact in the field of American insurance law. See, e.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE
TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT (1986); Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A PoliticalHistory, 100 YALE L.J. 1515
(1991).
16. 120 N.E. 86 (N.Y 1918).
17. Bird, 120 N.E. at 87 (emphasis added). In a subsequent decision, Smitb v. Nortbwestern
Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 159 N.E. 87, 93 (N.Y. 1927), then-Judge Cardozo recognized that
insurers as well as insureds could invoke this contractually based "reasonable expectations"
doctrine. See alsoJerry,Insurance, Contract,and Doctrine,supra note 1, at 32 ("Cardozo viewed
reasonable expectations as a two-way street; each party was entitled to assert them as the
other. Thus, in an insurance setting, Cardozo thought it as important to consider the reasonable expectations of insurers as it was to examine the expectations held by the insureds.").
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and obligations, and to determine the meaning of disputed terms in the
insurance contract, primarily by utilizing a number of interpretive rules
involving: (1) contract ambiguity; (2) contract unconscionability and public
policy issues; (3) the application of equitable remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and reformation of contract
to insurance coverage disputes; and (4) additional interpretive rules applied
to standardized insurance contracts as contracts of adhesion.i8 A significant
number of post-1970 judicial decisions continue to utilize this traditional
contractually based reasonable expectations doctrine to resolve insurance
contract coverage disputes. 9
Thus, there are currently two competing and overlapping doctrines of
reasonable expectations, both well established in theory and practice, that
co-exist in American insurance law today.
III. THE TRADITIONAL CONTRACTUALLY BASED INSURANCE LAW
DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS GENERAL PRINCIPLES

A. Doctrine of Ambiguities
The first general principle of an objective, contractually based insurance
law doctrine of reasonable expectations involves the doctrine of ambiguities. Under this widely recognized rule of insurance contract interpretation,
whenever an insurance policy is susceptible to two or more reasonable
interpretations ° so that an ambiguity exists, under the doctrine of contra
proferentem, such ambiguous policy language will be strictly construed
against the insurer who drafted the contract, and the language will be lib-

18. See, e.g., Coast Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Security Tide Ins. & Guar. Co., 57 P2d
1392, 1393 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936) (holding that an insurance policy provision "must be construed so as to give the insured the protection which he reasonably had a right to expect, and
to that end, doubts, ambiguities, and uncertainties arising out of the language used in the
policy must be resolved in his favor"); see also Ettlinger v. Importers & Exporters Ins. Co.,
247 N.Y.S. 260 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931); Mohan v. Union Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 216 A.2d 342
(Pa. Super. 1966); N.W. Elec. Power Cooperative v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 451
S.W 2d 356 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Harr v. Allstate Ins. Co.,.255 A.2d 208 (NJ. 1969). Indeed,
Professor Arthur Corbin, over a half century ago, listed his first "black letter" statement of
the law of contracts as the "Main Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable
Expectations Induced by Promises." ARTHUR L. COREIN, THE LAw OF CONTRAcTs, § 1 at 1
(1952).
19. See, e.g., Cody v. Remington Electric Shavers, 427 A.2d 810 (Conn. 1980); Strickland
v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 272 S.E.2d 148 (Ga. 1978); Simkins Indus. Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co.,
401 A.2d 181 (Md. Ct. App. 1979); Slater v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 400
N.E.2d 1256 (Mass. 1980). See generally CoUcH's CYCLOPEDtA, supra note 1, §§ 22:10-22:11;
HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, § 8.6.
20. See New Castle County v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162, 1182 (3d
Cir. 1991) (insurance policy language considered ambiguous only if it "permits two or more
reasonable interpretations"); Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Accident & Casualty Ins. Co., 796 F.
Supp. 929, 936 (W.D. Va. 1992) (similar holding).
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2
erally construed in favor of the insured who was the nondrafting party. '
Accordingly, most state and federal courts today have widely recognized
22
the doctrine of ambiguities in its most generalized conceptual form.
Yet, a closer analysis of the doctrine of ambiguities in an insurance law
context demonstrates that a wide interpretive disparity still exists in how
the courts actually apply this interpretive rule to specific insurance contract
disputes. Some courts, for example, will apply the doctrine of ambiguities
strictly against the insurer, irrespective of whether the insured was a "sophisticated policyholder," and without resorting to any extrinsic evidence
to resolve such uncertainty.23 This rather severe and formalistic application
of the doctrine of ambiguities in an insurance law context has been criti-

21. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 236(d) (1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
§ 206 (1981); COUCH'S CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, §§ 21:11-21:15; HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw, supra note 1, § 6.1; JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAw, Supra
note 1, § 25A; WINDT, supra note 1, § 6.02. Thus, the doctrine of ambiguities is a widely
recognized rule of contract interpretation in general, and insurance contract interpretation
in particular, even though this rule has been subject to some criticism. See, e.g., Rahdert,
Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, supra note 1, at 330, 369-70. But see Jeffrey Stempel,
Reassessingthe "Sopbisticated"Policybol4der Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L.
REv. 807, 810-11 (1993):
CONTRACTS

Contra proferentem continues to have force when applied to many coverage questions
because most policyholders are nondrafters who have nothing to say about the language
of the [insurance] contract. Consequently, if someone has to lose a contract dispute, one
can make a good case [that] it should not be the nondrafting policyholder....
The complex nature of insurance, the information disparity between insurer and
policyholder, the virtual necessity for insurance, and the industry's ability to collaborate
on contract terms without legal liability (because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act's antitrust exception for insurers) all make modern consumer insurance a stronger case for
calling close questions in favor of the nondrafter than were presented in the customized
land lease, sale of goods, and shipping contracts from which the ambiguity doctrine
sprang. Thus, the implicit rationale of contra proferenten continues with some vigor.
Id.;.see also Swisher, A Middle GroundApproacb to Insurance Contract Disputes, supra note 5, at
583-89.
22. See, e.g., Agfa-Gevaert A.G. v. A.B. Dick Co., 879 E2d 1518, 1521 (7th Cir. 1989)
(applying N.Y. law) ("mhe four-corners rule has now pretty much yielded to a rule that
"extrinsic" evidence may be introduced not only if the written contract is ambiguous on its
face, but also to show that it is ambiguous."); see also Harnett v. Southern Ins. Co., 181 So.
2d 524, 528 (Fla. 1965) ("So long as [insurance] contracts are drawn in such a manner that it
requires the proverbial Philadelphia lawyer to comprehend the terms embodied in it, the
courts should and will construe them liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer to protect the buying public who rely upon [the insurers and their agents] in such

transactions.");

STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT

DISPUTES, supra note 1, § 4.08.

23. See, e.g., Adrian Associates v. National Surety Co., 638 S.W2d 138, 140 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982) (language construction urged by the insured "must be adopted as long as the construction itself is not unreasonable, and even if the construction urged by the insurer appears to
be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the intent of the parties"); Niagra County
v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 427 N.YS.2d 171, 176 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (similar holding). A number
of other courts also have refused to admit extrinsic evidence in insurance contract disputes
involving the doctrine of ambiguities. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 794 E2d
710, 714-16 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (applying Indiana law); ACANDS, Inc. v. Aeta Cas. & Sur.
Co., 764 E2d 968, 973 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law).
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cized by some recent commentators. 4 A large and growing number of
other courts, however, have held that if the insurance policy terms are
ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence should be permitted to ascertain the
parties' true intent, and the contra proferentem rule interpreting ambiguous policy language in favor of the insured should be relied upon only as
a "last resort" interpretive tiebreaker.25
Another important element involving the contra proferentem doctrine
of ambiguities involves the so-called sophisticated policyholder defense.
Normally, the terms of an insurance contract will be construed and interpreted in their ordinary sense, rather than in a purely technical or legal
sense, from the viewpoint of the untrained mind or of the "common man
or woman in the marketplace. 2 6 However, should a sophisticated policyholder, such as an insurance company involved in a reinsurance or excess
insurance coverage dispute, or a large commercial policyholder with ready
access to legal and technical assistance in procuring and understanding its
insurance coverage, be*entitled to this same interpretive rule as the untrained policyholder or the "common man or woman in the marketplace"?
Again, the courts and commentators are split on this important issue.
Some courts have applied a strict contractual contra proferentem interpretation to every policyholder, irrespective of whether the insured policyholder was "sophisticated" or "unsophisticated" in procuring insurance
24. See, e.g.,

WINDT,

supra note 1, at 368-69:

[Under this strict rule] once an ambiguity is discovered, courts may not look first to
extrinsic evidence in order to eliminate the ambiguity; they may, instead, automatically
resolve the ambiguity against the insurer. This can, of course, result in the creation of
policy coverage when neither party intended or expected such coverage. This should not,
therefore, be the law....
The rule interpreting ambiguous policy language in favor of the insured should be
relied on only as a last resort. It should not be permitted to frustrate the intention of the
parties, if that intent can somehow be ascertained. As a result, courts should resort to
the rule only if an evaluation of the pertinent extrinsic evidence does not indicate the
parties' true intent.

Id.; see also

OSTRAGER AND NEWMAN,

supra note 1, at 5-7 (agreeing that the doctrine of

ambiguities should only be applied "as a last resort," and the doctrine should not arise "unless
it is first demonstrated that: (a) the policy is ambiguous; and (b) the ambiguity may not be
resolved by resort to extrinsic evidence of intent").
25. See, e.g., Rainer Credit Co. v. Western Alliance Corp., 217 Cal. Rptr. 291, 295 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1985); Inland Constr. Co. v. Home Indem. Co., 447 N.E.2d 1023, 1024 (Ill.
Ct.
App. 1983); General Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Barrett, 847 S.W2d 125, 132 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993);
see also Stempel, supra note 21, at 821 ("This notion of invoking the contraproferentemprinciple
as a tie-breaker only after consideration of extrinsic evidence specific to the case is the better
reasoned modem view of contract law.")
26. See, e.g., United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Colver, 600 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1979); Barber v.
Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 647 P.2d 1200, 1202 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); Pacific Indem. Ins.
Co. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 488 A.2d 486,488 (Md. 1985); Dixon v. Gunter, 636 S.W2d
437, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982). See generally Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach to Insurance
ContractDisputes, supra note 5, at 579-83.
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coverage or in understanding the technical language within the insurance
policy.2 7 Other courts, however, have recognized that in the real world
many insurance companies and large commercial corporations often are
sophisticated policyholders, and therefore they should not be entitled to
the doctrine of ambiguities as an interpretive rule, since this contra proferentem doctrine should be applied only to an unsophisticated policyholder or "common man or woman in the marketplace."2 But even under
this latter approach, an underlying interpretive problem remains to determine who is a "sophisticated" policyholder and who is not.
"Sophisticated policyholder" has been defined in one insurance law treatise as commercial policyholders whose "business insurance policies ...are
typically negotiated (and often drafted) on behalf of the insured by sophisticated brokers, risk managers, and/or counsel ... "29 However, this
overly broad definition of "sophisticated policyholder" has come under
attack by other commentators:
27. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Grand Chapter of Phi Sigma Kappa, 651 E Supp.
1042 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying doctrine of ambiguities to commercial policyholders as well
as to ordinary consumers unless parties possessed equal bargaining power); Minier v. Travelers
Indem. Co., 159 E Supp. 230 (N.D. Ill. 1958) (doctrine of ambiguities is based, not upon the
sophistication or bargaining power of the policyholder, but on concept that the insurer drafted
the policy); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992)
(sophistication of the insured is irrelevant); see also Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784
P.2d 507 (Wash. 1990).
28. See, e.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 632 E2d 1068, 1080
(3d Cir. 1980) (applying Pennsylvania law) ("If an ambiguity does exist and if the insurer
wrote the policy or is in a stronger bargaining position than the insured, the ambiguity is
generally resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer. However, the principle that
ambiguities in policies should be strictly construed against the insurer does not control the
situation where large corporations, advised by counsel and having equal bargaining power,
are the parties to a negotiated policy."); Eagle Leasing Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 540
F2d 1257, 1261 (5th Cir. 1976) (applying Missouri law) ("We do not feel compelled to apply,
or indeed, justified in applying the general rule that an insurance policy is construed against
the insurer in the commercial insurance field when the insured is not an innocent, but a
corporation of immense size, carrying insurance with annual premiums of six figures, managed
by sophisticated business men, and represented by counsel on the same professional level as
the counsel for the insurers."); see also Halpern v. Lexington Ins. Co., 715 E2d 191 (5th Cir.
1983).
29. See BARRY OSTRAGER AND THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE CONTRACT DlsPUTES § 1.03[c], at 26 (7th ed. 1994). In a later edition to their treatise, Ostrager and Newman
state that:
The courts that have declined to apply the contra-insurer rule [to sophisticated policyholders] have relied on evidence establishing the equivalence of bargaining power between the insurer and the insured, including: (1) the large size of the business insured,
(2) the involvement of counsel on behalf of the insured in the negotiation of the policy,
(3) the representation of the insured by an independent broker in the negotiation of the
policy, (4) the use of a "manuscript" policy [an individually negotiated and drafted policy,
rather than a standard form policy], (5) the "insurance" sophistication of the insured, (6)
whether the dispute is between two insurance companies, and (7) whether the parties
possess equal bargaining power.
OSTRAGER AND NEWMAN, supra note 1, at 26-36 (9th ed. 1998).
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The first obvious problem with the sophisticated policyholder argument is
that standard form insurance policies contain no "sophisticated" policyholder
exclusion, although nothing prevents the insurance industry from drafting
one.30 That a "sophisticated" policyholder exclusion does not exist is strong
evidence that insurance companies never intended to treat commercial and
individual policyholders differently. In fact, insurance companies apparently
have no specific criteria to determine what constitutes a "sophisticated" policyholder. One insurance company argued (unsuccessfully) that a policyholder
who had graduated from business school was a sophisticated policyholder.3'
The slippery slope character of the "sophisticated" policyholder argument is
self-evident.
Holding commercial policyholders to a higher standard based on nebulous
factors such as size and wealth "suggests that big companies ought to receive
less insurance coverage than small companies, notwithstanding that big companies pay big premiums for their coverage."3 The size or wealth of a commercial policyholder has nothing to do with its understanding of the language
in its insurance policy.
The truth is that America's largest corporations purchase standard form
policy language just like everybody else.33 In fact, most large commercial
policyholders do not purchase "manuscript" policies, and policies that insurance companies purport to be manuscript policies are often no more than a
4
typewritten version of the standard form language.1
Thus, since not all commercial policyholders will be sophisticated
policyholders, those courts that do recognize the sophisticated policyholder defense should be very hesitant to apply this troublesome exception
to the doctrine of ambiguities unless the policyholder clearly meets a number of necessary requirements to determine whether or not the policyholder is "sophisticated." Professor Jeffrey Stempel recommends that
courts employ the following factors:
First, courts should consider the actual identity of the drafter. At the outset,
commentators and courts should distinguish more carefully between situations
in which the policyholder is merely a sophisticated party adhering to a standardized contract of adhesion, and those cases in which the policyholder is
more than the consumer of a prefabricated insurance product. ... Second,

30. See generally Carl A. Salisbury, Pollution Liability Insurance Coverage, the Standard-Form
Pollution Exclusion, and the Insurance Industry: A Case Study in Collective Amnesia, 21 ENVTL. L.
357, 362-363 (1991).
31. See generally Brotherhood Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roseth, 532 N.E.2 d 354 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988).
32. See generally Salisbury, supra note 30, at 362.
33. Citing to David B. Goodwin, DisputingInsurance Coverage Disputes, 43 STANFORD L.
Rzv. 779, 796-97 (1991) (listing examples of cases involving large policyholders with insurance policies containing unvaried standard form language).
34. Anderson and Fournier, supra note 1, at 369-71. But see Stempel, supra note 21, at
855-57.
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courts should consider broker presence and activity.... Third, courts must
consider attorney presence and activity.... Fourth, courts should consider the
degree of negotiation surrounding the policy and whether it is fairly characterized as "customized" rather than standardized .... Fifth, courts must consider whether, regardless of the drafter's identity, the term in dispute is really
ambiguous if examined in light of the parties and the facts.... Sixth, courts
should consider the understanding conveyed by the oral and written conduct
of the parties surrounding the negotiation, finalization, and implementation
of the policy.... Seventh, courts should consider the presence of an objectively
reasonable expectation of or reasonable reliance upon coverage due to no fault
of the policyholder... Eighth, courts should consider the presence of a genuine contractual relationship between the disputants.... Ninth, courts must
consider the presence of extrinsic evidence.... Tenth, courts should consider
whether, in the absence of more probative evidence of contract meaning, it is
fundamentally fair to invoke contraproferentem against the insurer.... Finally,
courts must consider the impact of policyholder sophistication on contract
doctrines other than ambiguity.... 15
In resolving any insurance contract ambiguity, therefore, a court must
assess the two or more reasonable competing interpretations offered by the
parties in order to decide which interpretation is to be preferred. Over the
years the courts have established certain interpretive rules, found in a
wealth of judicial precedent and commentary, 6 and largely codified in the
37
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
These important interpretive rules include the following:
(1) In choosing among reasonable alternative meanings in an agreement
or terms within that agreement, the meaning that operates against the
drafting party is generally preferred;38
(2) Words and other conduct are interpreted in the light of all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties is ascertainable, it
is given great weight;39
(3) A writing is interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of
the same transaction are interpreted together;4°
35. Stempel, supra note 21, at 849-57. See also OSTAGER AND NEWMAN, supra note 29;
supra note 1, § 4.11.
36. See generally 3 CORBIN ON CONrRACTS §§ 532-560 (1960); WINDT, supra note 1, § 6.02.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 201, 202, 203, 206, and 207 (1981).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1981) (citing with approval 3 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 559 (1960 and Cum. Supp. 1980) and SAMUEL WILLISTON, 4 A TREASTISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 621 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961)). Once again, this
STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTrRACT DISPUTES,

rule does not apply if the nondrafting party's interpretation is unreasonable. See, e.g., Intertherm Inc. v.Coronet Corp., 558 S.W2d 344 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977). This is the "basic bedrock
insurance rule of contra proferentem." HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1,
§ 5.8 at 99 (2d ed. 1996).
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (1981).
40. Id. § 202(2).
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(4) Where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted
4
in accordance with that meaning; '
(5) Technical terms and words of art are given their 2technical meaning
4
when used in a transaction within their technical field;
(6) Where an agreement involves repeated performances, any course of
performance accepted or acquiesced by the other party is given great
4
weight in the interpretation of the agreement;
(7) Whenever reasonable, the terms of the agreement are to be interpreted as consistent with each other, and with any relevant course of performance, course of dealing, or trade usage;(8) An interpretation that gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation that leaves a part
4
unreasonable, unlawful, or of no effect;
(9) Express terms are given greater weight than terms implied from a
course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade; course of
performance is given greater weight than course of dealing or usage of
trade; and course of dealing is given greater weight than usage of trade;(10) Specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general
47
language;
(11) Separately negotiated or added terms are given greater weight than
standardized terms or other terms not separately negotiated 48 so if provisions of a policy endorsement are in conflict with the body of the policy,
the endorsement will control, 49 and typewritten provisions will supersede
printed provisions when the two conflict; 0
(12) In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement, or a term thereof, a meaning that serves the public interest is generally preferred.5'
These interpretive rules in resolving insurance contract ambiguities,
however, were not established in a vacuum, and various interpretive co41. Id. § 202(3)(a).
42. Id. § 202(3)(b).
43. Id. § 202(4).
44. Id. § 202(5).
45. Id. § 203(a).
46. Id. § 203(b).
47. Id. § 203(c).
48. Id. § 203(d).
49. See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's v. Engs Motor Truck Co., 185 Cal. Rptr.
613, 614 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982); Central fll. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co.,
608 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ill. Ct. App. 1992); County of Columbia v. Continental Ins. Co., 634
N.E.2d 946, 950 (N.Y. 1994).
50. See, e.g., Eureka Investment Corp. v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 530 E Supp. 1110, 1118
(D.D.C. 1982); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 445 A.2d 535, 536 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1982).

51. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 207 (1981).
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nundrums continue to exist in many contemporary American insurance
2
coverage disputes, as will be discussed more fully below.1
B. Contract Unconscionabilityand Public Policy Issues
Although some courts and commentators believe that a traditional, contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations is limited only to the
judicial application of the doctrine of ambiguities, 3 there is a second, and
equally powerful, basis for ascertaining the reasonable expectations of the
parties: whether or not a particular insurance contract, or any term or
provision within that insurance contract, is unconscionable. Moreover,
where Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 206 (1981) has been described as the "basic bedrock rule" supporting the contra proferentem doctrine of ambiguities, 4 the "basic bedrock rule" for interpreting contract
unconscionability is Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 208 (1981).
Section 208 provides the following:
If a contract or term thereof is unconscionable at the time the contract is made
a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may enforce the remainder of
the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application
of an unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result."
Since the concept of contract unconscionability is rather vague, 6 the
scope of section 208 is arguably very broad, and may be liberally construed
by the courts:
Like the obligation of good faith and fair dealing (section 205),5" the policy
against unconscionable contracts or terms applies to a wide variety of types of
52. See infra notes 86-127 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 20-51 and accompanying text. A number of courts still insist upon the
existence of an ambiguity as a prerequisite for a court to apply the doctrine of reasonable
expectations. See, e.g., Wellcome v. Home Ins. Co., 849 P.2d 190 (Mont. 1993) (holding that
the insured's reasonable expectation to coverage contrary to the clear and unambiguous policy
language is not "objectively reasonable"); see also Sturla v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 684 P.2d
960 (Haw. 1984); Silk v. Flat Top Constr. Co., 453 S.E.2d 356 (W. Va. 1994). See generally
Jerry, Insurance, Contract, and Doctrine, supra note 1, at 139-40.
54. See supra notes 21 and 38 and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208 (1981).
56. See, e.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, 8 A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 18.8 at 4647 (Richard A. Lord ed., 4th ed. 1998):
Unconscionability is a vague concept that the courts, practicing attorneys, and contract
drafters have struggled with since well before the widespread adoption of the [Uniform
Commercial Code, § 2-302-1]. The Uniform Commercial Code does not provide a
definition for the term "unconscionable," but gives the courts broad latitude in determining, either on their own initiative or based on an assertion by a party, that a particular
contract or clause was unconscionable as a matter of law at the time the agreement was
made.
Id.
57. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF COTRACTS § 205 (1981). See generally DENNIS J. WALLS,
LITIGATION AND PREVENTION OF INSURER BAD FAITH (2d ed. 1994); WILLIAM SHERNOFF ETAL.,
INSURANCE BAD FATH LITIGATION (1984); Symposium on the Law of Bad Faith in Contractand
Insurance, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1203 (1994).
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conduct. The determination that a contract or term is or is not unconscionable
is made in the light of its settling, purpose, and effect. Relevant factors include
weaknesses in the contracting process like those involved in more specific rules
as contractual capacity, fraud, and other invalidating causes; the policy also
overlaps with rules that render particular bargains or terms unenforceable on
grounds of public policy. Policing against unconscionable contracts or terms
has sometimes been accomplished "by adverse construction of language, by
manipulation of the rules of offer and acceptance or by determinations that
the clause is contrary to public policy or to the dominant purpose of the contract."5 8 Particularly in the case of standardized agreements, the rule of this
section permits the court to pass directly on the unconscionability of the contract or clause rather than to avoid unconscionable results by interpretation."
The genesis of this unconscionability rule in an insurance law context is
the recognition that most insurance contracts, rather than being the result
of anything resembling equal bargaining between the parties, are often
contracts of adhesion 60 in which many insureds face two options: (1) accept
the standard insurance policy offered by the insurer; or (2) go without
insurance. The unconscionability rule therefore essentially states that:
(1) an insured's reasonable expectation to coverage on reading the policy
should guide policy construction; and (2) policy provisions should not be
construed to reach a result that is unconscionable.6 This unconscionability
rule is the outgrowth of ordinary contract law, which has long recognized
that some terms in a contract of adhesion are so one-sided that they should
not be enforced, even if the parties were both aware of the intended effect
62
of such contractual provisions at the time of contracting.
Thus, according to Williston on Contracts, although freedom of contract
has been regarded as an important part of our common law heritage, so
that absent mistake, fraud, or duress, parties who have made a contract are
generally bound by their contract (even though it may be an unwise or
foolish contract), a court of equity may refuse to enforce contractual agreements when, in its discretion, the contractual terms have been deemed to
be unconscionable. 63 This applies with equal force to insurance contracts
as well.Contract unconscionability may be procedural or substantive:
58. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 cmt. 1.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. a (1981).
60. See PART V infra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
61. See COUCH'S CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, § 22:11, at 22-23.
62. Id. at 22-27; see also HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, § 8.6.
63. See WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 56, § 18.1 at 2-9 (4th ed.).
64. Id. § 18.5; see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 481 A.2d 298 (NJ. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Atlantic Indem. Co., 468 S.E.2d 570
(N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Bishop v. Washington, 480 A.2d 1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
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The concept of unconscionability was meant to counteract two generic forms
of abuses: the first of which relates to procedural deficiencies in the contract
formation process, such as deception or refusal to bargain over contiact terms,
today often analyzed in terms of whether the imposed-upon party had meaningful choice about whether and how to enter into the transaction; and the
second of which related to the substantive contract terms themselves and
whether those terms are unreasonably favorable to the. more powerful party,
such as terms that impair the integrity of the bargaining process or otherwise
contravene the public interest or public policy. .... s

Moreover, since the insurance business is influenced by a strong public
interest, 66 and is regulated through state legislative statutes, judicial decisions, 67 and administrative regulations, 6 it is appropriate that public policy
should influence the determination of insurance coverage disputes. 69 Thus,
a determination of whether an insurance policy provision is in violation of
state public policy is another important component found in the rule pro70
hibiting unconscionable insurance contracts.
C. JudicialApplication of Equitable Remedies, Including Waiver, Estoppel,
Election, and ContractReformation
A-third, and increasingly powerful, judicial validation of the contractually
based reasonable expectations doctrine is found in the application of certain
equitable remedies, including waiver, estoppel, election, and reformation
65. See WILLISTON ON

CONTRACTS,

supra note 56, § 18.10 at 57 (4th ed.).

66. Insurance is affected with a strong public interest, and thus an insurer's alleged constitutional right to contract with its insureds free from state regulation will be rejected by the
courts unless the objectives of state statutory, judicial, and administrative regulation go well
beyond the reasonable and legitimate interest of the state. See California State Auto. Ass'n
Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Maloney, 341 U.S. 105 (1951). See generally Spencer Kimball, The Purpose
oflnsuranceRegulation, 45 MINN. L. REv. 471,490-91 (1961) (defining insurance law as hybrid
of contractual law and state statutes that seek to enable the insured to enter into a fair and
equitable contract).
67. See generally Spencer Kimball and Werner Pfennigstorf, Legislative andJudicialControl
of the Terms of Insurance Contracts, 39 IND. LJ. 675 (1964).
68. See generally Spencer Kimball and Werner Pfennigstorf, Administrative Control of the
Terms of Insurance Contracts,40 IND. LJ. 143 (1965).
69. The test of whether or not an insurance contract is void as against public policy is
whether it is injurious to the public or contravenes some important established social interest,
or when its purpose is to promote, effect, or encourage a violation of law. See L'Orange v.
Medical Protective Co., 394 F2d 57 (6th Cir. 1968) (applying Ohio law); see also Kirk v.
Financial & Life Ins. Co., 389 N.E.2d 144,147-48(111. 1978) (insurance department approval
of policies of insurance is entitled to great weight against contention that such a provision is
against public policy); Scarbrough v. Travelers Ins. Co., 718 F2d 702, 709 (5th Cir. 1983)
(holding that an insurance policy is the "law between the parties" and must be enforced as
written unless the insurance policy provisions are contrary to state public policy or statutory
law). See generally supra notes 45 and 51 and accompanying text.

70. See generally HOLMES'

supranote 1,§§ 9.1-9.8; STEMPEL,
supra note 1, § 4.10; Swisher, J7udicialRationalesin

APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW,

LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DIsPUTEs,

Insurance Law, supra note 5, at 1062-66.
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of contract. Although these equitable remedies traditionally were not
grouped under a reasonable expectations rubric, a growing number of commentators and courts now include them as important components of any
reasonable expectations doctrinal analysis and discussion. 7' For example,
Professor Eric Holmes discusses these interrelated interpretive components as follows:
In the latter half of the 20th century, courts have been making an equitable
adjustment of the rights and obligations under mass-standardized insurance
contracts of adhesion. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, courts (somewhat
covertly) equitably readjusted the traditional, formal contract law of interpretation and construction by applying "contra proferentem" (construing ambiguities against the insurers), waiver, election, reformation and rescission, as well
as equitable estoppel. Modem courts, more forthrightly, are invoking their
equity jurisdiction and applying equitable principles, such as good faith, unconscionability, honoring objectively reasonable expectations ... as well as
72
promissory estoppel.
These equitable remedies are largely justified by the fact that insurance
coverage today is sold by a multitude of insurance agents who often emphasize the insured's "peace of mind" and reasonable expectation of coverage, 71 even though an insured seldom reads his or her policy,7 4 and even
though there may be a number of contractual conditions, limitations, and
exclusions within the insurance policy that the insurer subsequently may
cite in order to void the policy and defeat coverage.7" Since forfeiture of
coverage is not favored under insurance law, many courts are inclined to
look for any circumstance that indicates a willingness by the insurer to
waive any forfeiture of coverage, or that precludes the insurer under prin76
ciples of estoppel from enforcing such a forfeiture of coverage.
In its traditional sense, waiver has been defined as the voluntary and
intentional relinquishment of a known right, which may result from either
the affirmative acts of the insurer or its authorized agents, or from the
insurer's inaction, with knowledge of the applicable facts. 7
71. See, e.g., HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, at 283-92; Swisher, A
Middle GroundApproach to Insurance Contract Disputes,supra note 5, at 589-96.
72. See

HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAw,

supra note 1, at 364.

73. See, e.g., Robert Jerry II, Remedying Insurers' Bad Faith Contract Performance:A Reassessment, 18 CONN. L. REV. 271, 298-99 (1986) (insurance agents often emphasize the catastrophic effects of loss, and the "peace of mind" that insurance provides, when attempting to
convince a prospective insured to purchase insurance coverage).
74. See, e.g., Powers v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 398 N.W2d 411, 413 (Mich.
1986) (very few insureds read the purchased contract, and query whether they would understand it if they did).
75. See generally Tom Baker, Constructing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims
Stories, and Insurance ContractDamages, 72 TEx. L. REv. 1395 (1994).
76. See, e.g., COUCH'S CYCLOPEDA, supra note 1,§ 22:36 (citing numerous illustrative cases).
77. See, e.g., Kramer v.Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 494 E Supp. 1026 (D.N.J. 1980); Hen-
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Professor Jerry observes that in the context of contemporary insurance
contract disputes, the term "waiver" has been used in so many different
ways by the courts, and with "numerous confusing and contradictory definitions" of the term. Nevertheless, Professor Jerry concludes that "from
the perspective of a court that needs a principle on which to rest a particular
result, the doctrine of waiver can be of considerable assistance in deciding
cases. In other words, the doctrine has considerable potential for flexible
application by courts to achieve justice in particular situations where other
doctrines seem inappropriate."7 8
Estoppel, on the other hand, does not require any actual surrender of a
known right, which is generally required for waiver. Instead, the doctrine
of estoppel implies some misleading act, conduct, or inaction on the part
of the insurer or its agent, upon which the insured detrimentally relies.79
Moreover, a growing number of courts have begun to apply the doctrine
of promissory estoppel to insurance coverage disputes as well.80
The doctrine of election is a hybrid legal remedy between waiver and
estoppel. It contemplates a rule of law that restricts the actor-normally
the insurer-to a choice from among a limited number of legal options. It
is similar to estoppel because it is an imposed rule of law, and it is similar
son v. Celtic Life Ins. Co., 621 So. 2d 1268 (Ala. 1993); Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ehrhardt,
518 A.2d 151 (Md. Ct. App. 1986). See generally WINDT, supra note 1, at 468-73. Waiver
principles have long been recognized and are well-established supplemental rules of American
contract law. See ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 8.5, 8.19 (1990); ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 752-766 (1 vol. ed. 1952); see also COUCH ON
INSURANCE, supra note 1, § 85.1-85:64; HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note
1, §§ 8.1-8.4.
78. Jerry, Insurance, Contract,and Doctrine,supra note I, at 147.
79. See Loyola Univ. v. Humana Ins. Co., 996 F.2d 895, 902 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying
Illinois law) ("estoppel occurs when one party knowingly represents or conceals a material
fact and the other party, not knowing the truth, reasonably relies on the misrepresentation
or concealment to his [or her] detriment"); see also CoucH's CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1,
§§ 85:2-85:64; HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, §§ 8.1-8.4. Increasingly,
the courts are viewing estoppel in terms of the standard set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts:
(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action
or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). Estoppel, like waiver, has long been
recognized and established as a supplemental rule of American contract law. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 77, §§ 2.19, 6.12; CORBIN, supra note 77, §§ 93-209; STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CoNTRmcr DIsPUTs, supra note 1, § 5.03.
80. Promissory estoppel evolved historically from equitable estoppel. Both forms of estoppel require the element of detrimental and reasonable reliance, but where equitable estoppel
is defensive (and cannot create insurance coverage) promissory estoppel is offensive (and may
affirmatively create insurance coverage). See generally 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 8.1-8.13;
HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, § 8.5; STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT DIsPtrrEs, supra note 1, § 5.05. See also Eric Mills Holmes, Restatement ofPromissory
Estoppel, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 263 (1996). But see Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The
Perilsof PromissoryEstoppel, 49 HASTINGS LJ.1191 (1998).
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to waiver because a choice must still be made by the actor.81 According to
Professors Keeton and Widiss, although the concept of election is more
troublesome for the courts to employ than either waiver or estoppel, it is
often more useful for the insured to utilize since it does not require the
voluntary relinquishment element of waiver or the detrimental reliance
factor of estoppel. 82
The insured has a final contractual remedy to safeguard his or her reasonable expectation to coverage in the form of contract reformation. If an
insurance agent makes an innocent or fraudulent representation to the
insured regarding policy coverage, the insured may bring an action for
reformation of the insurance contract based upon a mutual mistake of the
parties, or based upon mistaken or fraudulent representations or conduct
of the insurer or its agent who issued the policy.83
Thus, as this author concluded in an earlier law review article:
The legal doctrines of waiver, estoppel, election, and reformation of contract,
as utilized in a realistic middle ground interpretive approach to insurance coverage disputes, therefore provide additional parameters for judicial discretion
in recognizing and honoring the insured's reasonable expectation of coverage
that are supplemental to-rather than at variance with-the terms of the par84
ties' insurance contract.
IV. THE WILLISTON SCHOOL OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
INTERPRETATION VERSUS THE CORBIN SCHOOL AND A
CONSENSUS SOLUTION

A. Introduction
It is generally acknowledged that the interpretation of insurance contract
disputes is the function of the judge, as a matter of law, rather than of the
81. See, e.g., Walker v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp. 686 (D. Minn. 1983);
Home Indem. Co. v. Bush, 513 P.2d 145 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (both involving property
insurance elections to repair or replace the building or pay a monetary claim). The doctrine
of election may also be applied against the insured. See Dunn v. Way, 786 P.2d 649 (Mont.
1990) (holding that the insureds' failure to elect whether they wished to replace destroyed
items under their homeowners' insurance policy or seek reimbursement from the insurer on
the basis of depreciated costs precluded a suit against the insurer); see also FARNswORTH, supra
note 77, § 8.19.
82. See generally KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 1,at 618-20.
83. See, e.g., Continental Cas. Co. v. Didier, 783 S.W2d 29 (Ark. 1990) (holding that a
written instrument may be reformed if there has been a mistake by one party accompanied
by fraud or other inequitable conduct by the other party); Magnus v.Barrett, 557 N.E.2d 252
(Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that reformation of contract would be allowed only when clear
and convincing evidence compels the conclusion that the contractual instrument as it stands
does not properly reflect the intention of the parties, and that there has been either a mutual
mistake by the parties or a mistake by one party and fraud by the other). See generally FARNsWORTH, supra note 77, § 7.5; CoucH's CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 1, §§ 26:1-28:21; Irwin J.
Schiffres, Annotation, Reformation of Insurance Policy to Correctly Identify Risks and Causes of
Loss, 32 A.L.R. 3d 661-735 (1970).
84. Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach to Insurance ContractDisputes, supra note 5, at 596.
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jury."' But what interpretive principles should a judge utilize in order to
resolve insurance coverage disputes? Throughout most of the twentieth
century, and arguably well into the twenty-first century, many courts, practitioners, and legal scholars have battled for what Professor Robert Jerry
calls "the soul of contract law":
On one side are the formalists or classicists, whose champions are Professor
Williston and the first Restatement of Contracts.The formalists care mightily
about texts and the four comers of documents. They believe that words often
have a plain meaning that exists independently of any sense in which the
speaker or writer may intend the words. They insist that a court or a party can
discern the meaning of contractual language without asking about the intentions or expectations of the parties. They contend that interpretation is appropriate only if an ambiguity appears on the face of the document, which
means that the parties by their own testimony about what they intended or
expected cannot create an ambiguity where none exists. ... In the world of
the formalists, an insurer that drafts a clear form should be entitled to rely on
that form in setting rates without worrying that a court will disregard the finely
tuned, clear language....
The other contestants in the battle for the soul of contract law are the
functionalists, who are sometimes also labeled as the progressives, the realists,
or the post-classicists. The champions of this side are Professor Corbin and
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.The functionalists care less about the text
of contracts, believing it to be most useful as an articulation of the objective
manifestations of the contracting parties and as a means to understanding their
intentions and expectations.... Text does not have inherent meaning, but text
means what the drafter or speaker knows or should know the other side will
understand those words to mean in context.... Where a form is standardized,
the functionalists substitute objectively reasonable expectations for whatever
the particular recipient of the form understood, given that the recipient has
less reason to know what the drafter means, while the drafter has insights into
6
what the ordinary, reasonable recipient of the form is likely to understand.8
B. The Williston School of Insurance Contract Interpretation
In an insurance law context, legal formalism is best exemplified by the
seminal writings and major influence of Professor Samuel Williston relat85. See, e.g., Parsons v. Bristol Dev. Co., 402 P.2d 839, 842 (Cal. 1965) (according to justice
Traynor, insurance contract interpretation is "solely a judicial function" unless the interpretation turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence.). See generally CoUCn's CYCLOPEDIA, supra

note 1,at § 21:3 (the construction and effect of a written contract of insurance is a matter of
law, to be determined by the court and not by the jury); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212 (1981) (interpretation of an integrated agreement to be determined by trier of

fact if it depends on credibility of extrinsic evidence or on a choice among reasonable inferences to be drawn from extrinsic evidence; otherwise it is a question of law).
86. Jerry, Insurance, Contract,and Doctrine, supra note 1, at 55-56. See also JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INsURANcE LAW, supra note 1, § 25a at 129-34; Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach

to Insurance Contract Disputes,supra note 5, at 103 7-58; infra note 99 and accompanying text.
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ing to American contract law in general, and American insurance law in
particular.8 7 The bedrock principle underlying Williston's formalistic view
of insurance contract interpretation is that an insurance policy must be
construed and enforced according to general principles of contract law,"l
and courts therefore are not at liberty to reinterpret or modify the terms
of a clearly written and unambiguous insurance policy, but must look at
the "plain meaning" of the insurance contract:
Under the guise of interpretation, courts are repeatedly importuned to give a
meaning to the writing under consideration, which is not to be found in the
instrument itself, but which is based entirely on direct evidence of intention.
And just as steadfastly, the courts reiterate the well-established principle that
it is not the function of the judiciary to change the obligations of a contract
which the parties have seen fit to make. 9
Nevertheless, Professor Williston also recognized a number of contractual rights and remedies under this formalistic and textual interpretive approach to American contract law in order to ascertain and protect the
reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, when appropriate, including recognition of the doctrine of ambiguities, 90 contract unconscionability and public policy factors, 91 and other equitable contractual remedies. 92 Indeed, Professor Williston always recognized that judges do have
the discretion to modify the terms of a contract when justice requires:
When it is said that courts will neither make nor modify contracts, nor dispense with their performance, it is meant that such power will not be exercised
except in accordance with legal principles, the statement is sound; but if the
meaning is that parties to contracts are always liable in accordance with their
terms, it is far too narrow a limitation of the functions of the common law,

and a court which insists upon such a statement obliges itself in various situations to use the confusing language of fiction in order to achieve correct
87. See, e.g.,

SAMUEL WILLISTON,

THE LAW

OF

CONTRACTS (1921);

WILLISTON ON CON-

TRACTS, supra note 38 (3d ed.); WILLISTON ON CorRAcrs, supra note 56 (4th ed.). Professor
Williston was also the Reporter for the Restatement of the Law of Contracts(1928).
88. See, e.g., 7 WILLISTON ON CONrTRACTS § 900, at 28, supra note 38 (3d ed.) (unless
contrary to statute or public policy, contract of insurance will be enforced according to its
terms).
89. See id. § 610, at 511; see also 2 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 6:3, supra note 56 (4th ed.)
("[Slince the formation of... contracts depends not upon an actual meeting of the minds,
but merely upon manifestations of assent, an actual intention to accept isunimportant except
where the acts or words of the offeree are ambiguous.").
90. See supra notes 20-51 and accompanying text; see also 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§§ 621, 627, supra note 38 (3d ed.).
91. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text; see also 14 WILLISTON ON CONrRAcTs
§§ 1632-1633, supra note 38 (3d ed.).
92. See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text; see also 5 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS,
§§ 275-279, 678-679, 745, 752, 763, supra note 38 (3d ed. 1961). Professor Williston also
recognized the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Id. §§ 691-692.
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results. Under the name of implied contracts (quasi-contracts) courts have
wisely imposed obligations on parties to contracts which they never agreed to
assume; and because of fraud, mistake, duress, impossibility and illegality, have
modified contracts or dispensed with their performance, simply because justice
required it. 93
Thus, a wise judge can still openly "do justice" under Professor Williston's formal and textual interpretive approach to insurance contract law, as
long as that judge operates within the established parameters of recognized
contractual rights, rules, obligations, and remedies.
It may not be readily apparent to many jurists, practitioners, and academic lawyers studying insurance law today, but in the early years of the
twentieth century, American insurance law was in sorry shape and badly
needed some uniformity and predictability in order to establish realistic
and viable legal rules for settling insurance coverage disputes. Professor
William Vance described this interpretive conundrum in 1911:
Policies became overgrown with a wilderness of warranties [and other limitations to coverage], many of the most trivial character, in which the rights of
the policyholder, however honest and careful, were in grave danger of being
lost. It was necessary for the courts to go to the rescue of the public.... The
unseemly struggle that ensued between the unwise insurers who sought so to
frame their policies as to compel the courts to allow them the dishonest benefit
of forfeitures unsuspected by the insured, and the courts who sought by liberal
construction, and sometimes distortion of the language of the policies, to do
justice in spite of the [policy language], resulted in a mass of litigation and
confused precedent, the likes of which cannot be found in any other field of
our law.94
Professor Williston's "plain meaning" approach was thus meant to address and alleviate some of these serious problems of uncertainty and unpredictability in the judicial interpretation of insurance contract disputes,
including some serious interpretive problems that arguably still exist
today.9
93. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 281-282 (1920) (footnotes
omitted).
94. William Vance, The History of the Development ofthe Warranty in InsuranceLaw, 20 YALE
LJ. 523, 534 (1911). John A. Appleman, author of the well-respected multivolume insurance
law treatise INsURANCE LAw

AND PRACTICE

(rev. ed. 1981), was former head of the legal

department of the State Farm Insurance Company during the 1930s when he also found
"much of the insurance field in chaotic condition." Id. at V, XI. This may have influenced his
treatise's pro-Williston philosophy of emphasizing a more formalistic and textual approach
to insurance contract disputes. Mr. Appleman also may have viewed insurance coverage disputes more from the perspective of a former insurance defense attorney than from the perspective of a policyholder attorney or an academic lawyer.
95. Compare, for example, the interpretive conundrum expressed by Professor Vance in
1911, supra note 94 and accompanying text, with the contemporary interpretive conundrum
of Professor Keeton's rights at variance with the insurance policy language doctrine, supra
note 13 and accompanying text.
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Although some commentators believe that Professor Williston's interpretive rules covering insurance contract disputes are from a "now bygone

era," 96 other commentators recognize that his "plain meaning" doctrine is
still being applied by a number of American courts today, at least in an
insurance law context. 97 So, although Professor Williston's formalistic and
textual approach to insurance contract interpretation has been widely rejected by a majority of academic lawyers and scholars today 98 in favor of
Professor Corbin's more functionalistic and contextual approach,9 9 a number of courts and commentators in the "real world" context of contemporary insurance law and practice continue to follow Professor Williston's
oft-cited legal axioms. 10 0
96. See James Fischer, Why Are Insurance ContractsSubject to Special Rules ofInterpretation?
Text Versus Context, 24 ARiz. ST. LJ.995, 1001 (1992); see also Symposium, ReconsideringGrant

Gilmore'sTHE

DEATH OF CONTRACT,

90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1-266 (1995).

97. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 21, at 810-11:
The plain meaning [Williston] approach [for interpreting insurance contract disputes]
is, however, far from extinct.... The potential implications of a large-scale refusal to
enforce boilerplate insurance policy clauses are apparently too daunting for the judiciary.
Instead, judges intervene on an ad hoc basis through other doctrines-for example,
waiver, estoppel, contra proferentem, and reasonable expectations-to police insurance
policies when perceived as necessary to avoid unfairness.
Id.; see also Swisher, A Middle Ground Approach to Insurance Contract Disputes,supra note 5, at
546-48.

98. See, e.g., 3 CoRBiN

ON CONTRACTS

§ 535: Do Words Used in a ContractHave Only One

True Meaning?, (1960 and 1999 Cum. Supp.). Corbin states:
The question in the title to this section is a small piece of sophistry on Professor Corbin's
part, of course, allowing him to decry further the injustices done by those who have rigid,
unsophisticated views of language and its function. By now, everyone is convinced: the
problem has become one of hyper-sophistication, and result-oriented opinions relying
on nothing more than subjective infusions of values into the language used by the parties.
Id. see also Stempel, Unmet Expectations,supra note 1, at 276 n.260.
99. See infra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1131, 1134 (Conn. 1990) (insurance policy is to be interpreted by same general rules that govern construction of any written
contract in accordance with intent of the parties as expressed in the policy); Showers v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 222 S.E.2d 198, 199 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975) (an insurance policy, which by clear and
unambiguous terms is limited in its coverage, cannot be so construed as to expand coverage
beyond its stated terms); American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. National Ins. Ass'n, 577 N.E.2d
969, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (court must ascertain the parties' intent as manifested in the
insurance contract and may not rewrite plain and unambiguous language). See also Insurance
Co. of N. Am. v. Adkisson, 459 N.E.2d 310, 313-14 (Ill.
Ct. App. 1984); Duke v. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 210 S.E.2d 187, 247 (N.C. 1974); Hybrid Equip. Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co.,
597 N.E.2d 1096, 1102 (Ohio 1992); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Ins.
Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983); Transit Cas. Co. v. Hartman's Inc., 239 S.E.2d 894 (Va.
1978) (similar holdings). See generally 13 JOHN A. APPLEMAN AND JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7386, 7402 (rev. ed. 1976) (an insurance contract will be enforced

according to its terms, unless ambiguous); 1-2

GEORGE COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE

§§ 1:4, 2:1, 2:12-2:13, 15:1-15:97 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., rev. 2d ed. 1984); WINDT, supra
note 1, at 352-58. Barry Ostrager and Thomas Newman restate Professor Williston's interpretive "plain meaning" doctrine in this manner:
LAw

As a general rule, the language of an insurance policy will be given its plain meaning and
there will be no resort to rules of construction unless an ambiguity exists.... Whenever
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Why is this formalistic interpretation of insurance contract disputes still
recognized and applied in so many American jurisdictions today? The answer may lie, in part, in the rather surprising resurgence of legal formalism
as a viable theory of contemporary American jurisprudence,10 1 in tort law' 02
as well as in contract law. 103 The answer may also lie, in part, in the fact
that Professor Williston's formalistic "plain meaning" interpretive approach has never been fully supplanted by Professor Corbin's functionalistic interpretive approach in many jurisdictions, at least in an insurance
law context. °4
there is any question of interpretation of a written contract, the court will seek to determine the intention of the parties as derived from the language employed.... In short,
any clause which has been inserted in an insurance policy with the insured's consent is
valid as long as it is clear, unambiguous, and not in contravention of public policy.
OSTRAGER AND NEwmAN, supra note 1, at 3-5.

101. See, e.g., GARY JAN AICHELE, LEGAL REALISM AND TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE X (1990) ("Impossible only a decade ago, 'mechanical jurisprudence' has made
a remarkable comeback, and a new legal formalism may yet triumph as the principal mode
of [judicial] interpretation."); JOHN AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEMOCRACY (1984); ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW (1990); MARIO JOgl, LEGAL PosITIvisM (1992). See also David Charny, The New
Formalism in Contract,66 U. Cm. L. REv. 842 (1999); G. Richard Shell, Contractsin the Modern
Supreme Court, 81 CAL. L. REv. 433,436 (1993) (finding the U.S. Supreme Court's contractual
jurisprudence in the 1980s and 1990s to be very formalistic and textual and driven by "promarket jurisprudence," making the assumption that a more formalistic focus on contractual
text generally aids commerce); Swisher, judicial Rationales in Insurance Law, supra note 5, at
1039-47; Swisher, A Middle Ground Approach to Insurance ContractDisputes, supra note 5, at
555-65.
102. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS xxviii (1999):
Over the last 10 or 15 years, tort doctrine has, if anything, reversed field. The more
recent cases have retreated cautiously from the great transformations of the 1960s and
1970s. Stabilization and modest retrenchment were brought on in part by judicial decision, and in part by legislative intervention that addresses, in addition to basic standards
of liability, such important topics as joint and several liability, defenses based on plaintiff's
conduct, and damages... [Flor better or worse, since roughly 1985, doctrinal issues
were more closely contested, and the direction and pace of legal innovation were no
longer preordained.
Id.; see also James A. Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in Products
Liability:An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. REv. 479 (1990); Theodore Eisenberg and James A. Henderson, Inside the Quiet Revolution in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 731 (1992).
103. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 1, Unmet Expectations, at 272-77 (concluding that after
a period of "unusual progressive ferment" in the 1960s and 1970s, "these social forces receded
before the more established social tide of ongoing commercial and political interests, who
successfully re-established the hegemony of the neoclassical contract paradigm").
104. See Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach to Insurance Contract Disputes, supra note 5, at
555-65. The pervasive influence of a number of insurance law treatises, as well as wellentrenched (and often unexamined) legal precedent in a number of states, supporting this
formalistic and textual interpretive approach to insurance contract disputes likewise helped
to sustain the Williston "plain meaning" approach to insurance coverage disputes. Id.; see also
supra note 100 and accompanying text. Finally, the continuing influence of the Williston on
Contractstreatise itself on the legal community cannot be minimized. As editor WalterJaeger
wrote in his Preface to 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, supra note 38:
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C. The Corbin School of Insurance Contract Interpretation
Where the formal and textual Williston on Contractstreatise begins with a
definition of traditional contractual terms'05 and the traditional offer, acceptance, and consideration contractual trilogy,'0 6 the more functional and
contextual Corbin on Contracts treatise succinctly states that "The Main
Purpose of Contract Law Is the Realization of Reasonable Expectations
Induced by Promises."'' 7 Moreover, within this continuing, and often contentious, clash for the "soul of contract law," 0 Professor Corbin was not
shy about criticizing Professor Williston's "plain meaning" interpretive
approach to contract disputes. For example, in answering his rhetoricaland crucial-interpretive question "Do Words Used in a Contract Have
Only One True Meaning?" Professor Corbin answered:
There is no single rule of interpretation of language, and there are no rules
of interpretation taken all together, that will infallibly lead to the one correct
understanding and meaning. In understanding the variable expressions of others, men must do the best they can and results must be determined even though
the understanding may be faulty. There is in fact no "one correct" meaning
of an expression; and the party choosing the expression may have no clear and
conscious meaning of his own. In reading each other's words, men certainly
see through a glass darkly; and yet it is necessary for men to act upon their
understanding, and it is necessary to hold men responsible for inducing others
to act ....

109

From the time of publication of the original treatise, it gained increasing recognition
throughout common law jurisdictions as a great legal classic of modem times. Many
years of painstaking effort have been given to the preparation of this new edition. The
editor has striven without stint to continue in the true WILLISTON tradition and to make
this treatise not only the leading authority on contracts, but a compact library on the
ever-expanding range of subjects involving contractual relations.
Id. at vii. Professor Richard Lord is the present editor of WILLISTON ON CoNrRACTS, supra
note 56 (4th ed. 1990-1999).
105. See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:1 etseq., supra note 56 (4th ed.).
106. Id. § 4:1.
107. 1 CORBIN ON CoNrRACTS § 1.1 lJoseph M. Perillo ed., 1993 rev. ed.); see also supra

note 18. Corbin's reasonable expectation interpretive concept has been adopted by most
contracts scholars and commentators today. See GORDON D. SCHArBER AND CLAUDE D. RowCONTRACTS § 88 at 147, § 6 at 11 (3d ed. 1990) ("One purpose of contract law is to
protect the reasonable expectation of persons who become parties to a bargain"). Other scholars who have identified and reiterated this reasonable expectation interest include: E. ALAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1990); LON FULLER AND MELVIN EISENBERG, BASIc CONTRACT LAW (5th ed. 1990); and FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE, AND ANTHONY KRONMAN, CoNrRACTs (3d ed. 1986).
108. See supra notes 86 and 98 and accompanying text.
109. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535 at 15-16 (1960). In the 1999 Cumulative Supplement
HER,

to volume three, Professors Lawrence Cunningham and Arthur Jacobson state:
The significance of this [concept] in contract law, and what Professor Corbin accurately
perceived, is that words operate similarly. They have an expressive function, and that is
what modem jurists, legal theorists, and lawyers honor when they throw away as archaic
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In the 1998 revised edition of Corbin on Contracts, Professor Margaret
Kniffin is even more straightforward with her assessment of the "plain
meaning" rule of contract interpretation:
The plain meaning rule is inconsistent with a number of general [contract
interpretation] rules that are universally accepted. The cardinal rule with
which all interpretation begins is that the purpose of interpretation is to ascertain the intention of the parties. The plain meaning rule can exclude proof
of their actual intention. There is universal agreement that the first duty of
the court is to put itself in the position of the parties at the time the contract
was made. It is wholly illogical for the court to do this without being informed
by extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the making of the
contract.110
Does this mean that an irreconcilable conflict exists, and must continue
to exist, between the Williston School and the Corbin School of insurance
contract interpretation? Not necessarily. Just as Professor Williston was
not as formalistic and textual as some courts and commentators have generally assumed,1 Professor Corbin, on the other hand, was not an unbridled contextual functionalist, as othei commentators have generally assumed. 1 2 For example, Professor Corbin cautiously wrote:
If, after a careful consideration of the words of a contract, in the fight of all
the relevant circumstances, and of all the tentative rules of [contract] interpretation based upon the experience of the courts and linguists, a plain and
definite meaning is achieved by the court, a meaning actually given by one
party as the other party had reason to know, it will not disregard this plain
and definite meaning and substitute another that is less convincing.... 113
In another part of his treatise, Professor Corbin also wrote:
Interpretation will not be described in this treatise as either strict or liberal.
The effort will be made to look at [contract] language and its limitations realistically and to state tentative working rules of interpretation and constructhe "plain meaning" doctrine. Those words are also possessed of an evocative function,
and it is this which is lost. Without it, all expression is gibberish. There must be a
superimposition, to a greater or lesser extent, of objective reality on the expressions of
the parties' expectations. It is this which adds the word reasonableto Corbin's formula.
Id. at 19.
110. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.7, at 37 (1998 rev. ed). It is questionable, however,
whether all these interpretive rules have been "universally accepted" to date. See supra notes
97, 98, 100 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 93 and accompanying text; see also Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 Nw. U. L. Rv. 49, 58-60 (1995) (pointing out that Professor Williston was more
concerned with the fairness of the contractual bargain than has been commonly believed).
112. See supra note 98.
113. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535 at 19-22 (1960). See also SCHAER AND ROHWER,supra
note 107, at 148 ("There is nothing wrong with 'plain meaning' and it may be a satisfactory
answer to interpretation questions in some cases, but the problem may be more difficult than
this expression indicates.").
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tion, drawn from the decisions of courts, that will measurably attain the purposes for which contract law exists. Usually the meaning that will be given to
expressions used in a contract transaction is the meaning that one of the parties
in good faith gave to them, if the other party knew or had reason to know that
he gave it. The meaning so adopted by the court should be reasonably "plain
and clear" after all the relevant evidence is in. It serves no useful purpose, after
14
adopting this meaning, to describe it as either "strict" or "liberal."
Accordingly, Professor Corbin-like Professor Williston-was not willing to reject a number of well-established rules of contract interpretation
in pursuit of his more functional and contextual approach to contract law,
and Professor Corbin-like Professor Williston- therefore continued to
recognize a large number of traditional interpretive rules of contract interpretation to help ascertain the parties' reasonable expectation to coverage, including: contract ambiguity and the doctrine of contra proferentem,1"5 contract unconscionability and public policy issues,"l 6 and equitable
remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election,
and reformation of contract."' A fair reading of both Williston on Contracts
and Corbin on Contracts therefore suggests that there are far more similarities than differences in their respective approaches to contract law in general, and insurance coverage disputes in particular.
D. Is There a Consensus Solution to This Interpretive Conundrum Between the
Williston and CorbinApproaches to Insurance Contract Interpretation?
A realistic consensus solution to this interpretive conundrum involving
Professor Williston's "plain meaning" formalist approach versus Professor
Corbin's functionalist reasonable expectations approach is to recognize
that, in the real world, the interpretation of insurance contracts can be
neither wholly objective nor wholly subjective-and a judge necessarily
must take into account both the subjective and objective intent of the
parties.
On one hand, a fully objective approach would permit a court to determine what it believed both parties meant given the usual meaning of the
disputed contract term. The court could therefore disregard the parties'
own understanding, or what they reasonably believed each other to understand."18 On the other hand, a fully subjective approach would limit a
court only to inquire into what each party actually believed. This approach
114. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 533 at 6-7 (1960), cited with approval in Garden State
Plaza Corp. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 189 A.2d 448, 455 (NJ. Super. 1963). See also 5 CORBIN ON
Cor-ACTS § 24.4 at 14-15 (1998 rev. ed.) (similar text).
115. See 3 CORBIN ON CoNTrAnrcTs

§

559 (1960).

116. See id. at vol. 6, §§ 1421-1454.
117. See id. at vol. 3A, §§ 752-766.
118. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.6 at 25 (1998 rev. ed.)
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in the real world would be an exercise in futility.' 19 Thus, a majority of
courts today now follow what has been called a "modified objective approach,"120 including elements of both objectivity and subjectivity, but with
primary emphasis on the parties' objective manifestation of intent as found
121
in the terms of the contract.
In an insurance law context, Professor Jeffrey Stempel has fairly and
comprehensively summarized this modem consensus approach to insurance coverage disputes in this manner:
The general rule of both contract law and insurance contract law is that words
used in a contract are to be given their ordinary and plain meaning. Where
an insurer uses contract language that is clear, broad, and unaffected by other
factors or notions of public policy or unconscionability, courts enforce this
language even where it dramatically limits coverage.
Of course, meaning is not always so universally plain that it can be objectively agreed upon; case reports of contract disputes attest to that. As a consequence, despite expressed admiration for the plain meaning rule, courts often
must resolve contract disputes based on material other than contract text. A
general rule at least as prominent and venerable as plain meaning posits that
the goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the intent of the contracting parties. Like textual meaning, however, discerning intent is often difficult, particularly where one or both parties seemingly had no specific intent
about the unforeseen issue that is now the subject of a coverage dispute.
Insurance policies present an interpretive situation both more and less favorable for plain meaning and intent than found with ordinary contracts. On
one hand, insurance policies are better candidates for the plain meaning approach because they are carefully drafted by a number of authors and issued
in standardized form, reducing the chances for ambiguity through oversight.
On the other hand, standardized policies inherently sweep broadly in language,
119. Id. at 26-27. See also Mellon Bank v. Aetna Bus. Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1006 (3d Cir.
1980). The Mellon court stated:
It would be helpful if judges were psychics who could delve into the parties' minds to
ascertain their original intent. However, courts neither claim nor possess psychic power.
Therefore, in order to interpret contracts with some consistency, and in order to provide
contracting parties with a legal framework which provides a measure of predictability,
the courts must eschew the ideal of ascertaining the parties' subjective intent.
Id. See generally Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. v. Nalco Chem. Co., 784 E Supp. 160, 166 (D.NJ.
1992) (courts look to objective intent in language of contract in light of circumstances surrounding the transaction).
120. This term is employed in KNA1P AND CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 416 (3d
ed. 1993).
121. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 201 cmt. a (1981):
a. "Objective"and "subjective" meaning.... When aparty is... held to a meaning of which
he has reason to know, it is sometimes said that the "objective" meaning of his language
or other conduct prevails over his "subjective" meaning. Even so, the operative meaning
is found in the transaction and its context rather than in the law or in the usages of people
other than the parties.
Id.; see also supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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having been designed to apply in a variety of situations and drafted by someone
who was not involved at all in the particular situation that has now come to
court.
Ultimately, solicitude for the consumer, the adhesive nature of insurance
policies, and judicial concern for the equities of the situation have made plain
meaning too difficult to apply as an across-the-board rule of decision, while a
pure intent-based approach has been restrained by the uncertainty resulting
from overly general draft language, lack of evidence (due to the nature of the
insurance contracting process), and concerns of equity in consumer cases.
Nonetheless, the allure of objective and formal contract law has driven much
of contract interpretation, and insurance law is no exception. The general rule
is that insurance policies are to be construed like any other contract. Modern
contract theory readily acknowledges that determining meaning is largely a
process of choice, laced with subjectivity and context, and views contract interpretation as the task of determining the intent of the parties; [and] it readily
22
turns to the text of the contract as the best evidence of that intent.... 1
Of course, a judge cannot make these interpretive decisions, or resolve
insurance coverage disputes, in a vacuum. A judge cannot rely on Grant
Gilmore's The Death of Contract'23 as precedential authority (even though
he or she may wish to do so) any more than a judge can rely on Jimmy
Buffet's Changes in Latitudes, Changesin Attitudes124 as precedential authority (even though he or she may wish to do so). In the real world, judges'
interpretive decisions involving insurance coverage disputes are constrained, controlled, and largely determined by the judicial and legislative
parameters found within each particular jurisdiction.121 Yet judges in juris122.
4-17.

SrEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES,

123. GRANT

GILMORE, THE DEATH OF

supra note 1, § 4.04, at 4-14 to

CONTRACT (2d ed. 1995):

In a nutshell, Gilmore posited that nonconsensual tort law in this century absorbed the
nineteenth-century contract-law construct. Gilmore was influenced by the legal realists,
who, although varying in their degree of skepticism, generally posited a lack of objectivity
and determinacy in our legal system. The realists believed that courts based their decisions not on abstract legal rules, but on the pragmatic evaluation of the context. Gilmore
asserted that the "death of contract" was inevitable: Contract law was an artificial "ivory
tower abstraction" improvised by Langdell in his famous casebook, nurtured by Holmes
in The Common Law, and restated by Williston to reflect late nineteenth- and early
twentieth-century society's dalliance with free-market economics and individualism.
Robert A. Hillman, The Triumph of Gilmore's THE

DEATH OF

CONTRACT, 90 Nw. U. L. REv.

32, 33 (1995). On the other hand, some torts scholars now argue that American tort law is
becoming more contractually based. See RICHADa EPSTEIN, supra note 102, at xxvii.
124. See JIMMY BUFFET, A PIRATE LOOKS AT FIFTY 61 (1998). •
125. See U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994)
(judicial precedents are presumptively correct); see also Swisher, A Middle GroundApproacb to
Insurance Contract Disputes,supra note 5, at 555-65 (discussing judicial precedent in insurance
coverage disputes):
Other commentators have complained that state insurance law case precedent is often
misleading since such precedent may be outdated, may have a pro-insurer bias, or a
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dictions that continue to recognize a pro-Williston "plain meaning" approach to insurance contract disputes, as well as judges in jurisdictions that
have adopted a more pro-Corbin finctionalistic approach to insurance
contract disputes, are both still able to "do justice and equity" in recognizing and validating the reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage 12 6 through well-recognized contractual rights and remedies, including:
the doctrine of ambiguities, contract unconscionability and public policy
defenses, and the application of waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory es27
toppel, election, and contract reformation principles.'
This so-called modified objective approach for interpreting insurance
contract disputes therefore provides additional parameters for judicial discretion in recognizing and honoring the insured's reasonable expectation
to coverage that is supplemental to-rather than at variance with-the
terms of the parties' insurance contract, while allowing a court to consider
evidence extrinsic to the insurance contract itself.
V. STANDARDIZED INSURANCE CONTRACTS AS CONTRACTS OF
ADHESION AND A CONSENSUS SOLUTION

Most insurance contracts are not negotiated by parties with equal bargaining power. Rather, insurance policies are often contracts of adhesion, where
the insurance company has a superior bargaining position and the insured
has to accept the policy on a "take it or leave it" basis if the insured desires
coverage. 2 " The negative aspect of contracts of adhesion, therefore, is that
number of recent insurance law decisions holding in favor of the policyholder may have
been vacated by state appellate courts or settled under seal. See, e.g., Roger Parloff,
Rigging the Common Law, THE AMERIcAN LAWYER AT 76 (March 1992). Parloff states:
"Eugene Anderson has been especially critical of the practices involved [in a number of
insurance coverage dispute cases]. 'You see brief after brief where [the insurer's lawyers]
" The fact that
say "The weight of authority is ... " or "most of the cases hold that.
they can manipulate the goddamn numbers is beyond belief.' "
Id.; see also Jill E. Fisch, Rewriting History: The Propriety of EradicatingPrior Decisional Law
Through Settlement and Vacatur,76 CORNELL L. REv. 589 (1991).
126. See supra notes 93 and 107 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 21-84, 90-93, 115-17, 122 and accompanying text.
128. See Edwin W Patterson, The Interpretationand Construction of Contracts, 64 COLJM.
L. REv. 833, 856 (1964) (describing the concept of a "contract of adhesion" as a rule of
construction where the court favors the weaker party whenever drafting party was in stronger
position); Arthur Leff, Contract as a Thing, 19 AM. L. REv. 131, 143 (1970) (stating that the
process of entering a contract of adhesion "is not one of haggle and cooperative process but
rather of a fly and flypaper"). See generally Fredrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some
Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. Rv. 629 (1943); Todd Rakoff, Contractsof
Adhesion:An Essay in Reconstruction,96 HARv. L REv. 1173 (1983); W David Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 H/ARv. L. REv. 529 (1971). See
also Healy Tibbitts Constr. Co. v. Employers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (insurance contracts regarded as contracts of adhesion expressing superior bargaining power of insurer); Powers v. Detroit Auto. Inter-Ins. Exchange, 398 N.W2d
411, 413 (Mich. 1986) (an insurance contract is "not a hard-bargained contract drafted by
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the contractual terms may be drafted to protect the insurer to the maximum
degree and to minimize the insured's right to coverage.12 9 Accordingly, the
state legislatures, in order to require substantive fairness in contracts of
adhesion, have a long history of dictating specific terms of insurance policies, 130 and contemporary courts, under newly empowered doctrines of
contract unconscionability and public policy defenses,' also have played
an important role in protecting the adhering party from contractual
oppression.'
On the other hand, standardized insurance adhesion contracts "are not
necessarily bad, although lawyers for policyholders often talk that way."' 33
Professor David Slawson, for example, estimates that approximately 99
percent of all contracts are standard form conracts, 3 4 and according to
Professor Friedrich Kessler, the benefits of standard form contracts are
fivefold: (1) saving contract formation costs; (2) reducing an agent's authority to modify the terms of the contract; (3) allowing collection of necessary underwriting data; (4) reducing performance costs; and (5) allowing
an insured to purchase packages of coverage that meet the insured's basic
needs, even when an insured is unable to identify all of his or her basic
insurance needs.' Thus, as the most recent edition of Corbin on Contracts
readily concedes:
Despite the potential that contracts of adhesion have for abuse, there are important advantages to their use. Indeed, they are essential to the functioning
two negotiators with equal bargaining skills and resources"; rather it "is a contract of adhesion,
a take-it-or-leave-it insurance policy not drafted by the buyer or even by the seller of the
policy, but by legal experts of a state, national, or international organization, hundreds and
maybe thousands of miles away"); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 425 P.2d 346, 347 (Nev.
1967) ("insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion, complex instruments unilaterally prepared by the insurer and seldom understood by the insured"). But see Fischer, supra note 96,
at 1014-15 (1992). Fischer states:
Even if insurance contracts involve standardized agreements provided in the proverbial
"take it or leave it" fashion, the pro-insured bias may amount to excessive correction if
courts fail to accurately and precisely identify the danger that standardized agreements
present. Use of the term "adhesion contracts" invites courts to employ a pro-insured bias
without first determining whether the contract terms, in fact, reflect a pro-insured or
pro-insurer bias.
Id.
129. See generally I CORBIN ON CONTRACTs § 1.4 at 13-15 (1993 rev. ed.). Seealso STEMPEL,
LAW OF INSURANCE CONrrAcT DIsPUTrEs, supra note 1, § 4.06.
130. See generallyJERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, §§ 20-25; KEETON
AND WIDISS, supra note 1, §§ 8.1-8.6.
131. See generally supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
132. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 129, at 15 (1993 rev. ed.).
133. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 1, § 4.06 at 4-38.

134. W David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking
Power, 84 HRv. L. REV. 529, 529 (1971).
135. Friedrich Kessler, Contractsof Adhesion-Some Thougbts About Freedom of Contract,43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 631-32 (1943). See also KEETON AND WIDISS, supra note 1, § 2.8; STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONrTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 1, § 4.06 (both discussing the advantages and disadvantages of standardized insurance contracts).

HeinOnline -- 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 759 1999-2000

760

Tort & Insurance Law Journal, Volume 35, Number 3, Spring 2000

of the economy. We live in an era of mass production of standardized goods
and services. ... The standardization of forms for contracts is a rational and
economically efficient response to the rapidity of market transactions and the
6
high cost of negotiations.1
Is there any consensus solution in the way that contemporary courts
should interpret adhesion-type standardized insurance policies? Professor
Karl Llewellyn offers one realistic and viable approach to the judicial interpretation of standardized insurance policies:
The answer, I suggest, is this: Instead of thinking about "assent" to boilerplate
clauses, we can recognize that so far as concerns the specific, there is no assent
at all. What has in fact been assented to, specifically, are the few dickered
terms, and the broad type of the transaction, but one thing more. That one
thing more is a blanket assent (not a specific assent) to any not unreasonable
or indecent terms the seller may have on his form, which do not alter or
eviscerate the reasonable meaning of the dickered terms. The fine print which
has not been read has no business to [undercut] the reasonable meaning of
those dickered terms which constitute the dominant and only real expression
of agreement .... 7

This common sense interpretive approach to standardized insurance
contracts postulates that the consumer-policyholder and the insurer are
both aware that the consumer probably has not read the standardized adhesion insurance policy in its entirety. This "real world" knowledge by both
consumers and insurers therefore creates an additional element to a traditional "bargained for" or "dickered" contractual assent. Thus, according
to Professor Llewellyn, standardized "boilerplate" terms in a contract
should be honored to the extent that: (1) they do not undercut the meaning
of the bargained-for terms and (2) they are not manifestly unfair. 3 A number of commentators have cited Professor Llewellyn's interpretive approach to standardized contracts with approval, specifically as applied to
insurance coverage disputes involving standardized insurance policies. 1 9
136. 1 CORBIN ON CoTrAscTs,supra note 129, at 15 (1993 rev. ed.).
137. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALs370-71 (1960).

138. Id.; see also Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Russell, 402 E2d 399 (10th Cir. 1968); Frank
Lucas Ins. Agency Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 425 A.2d 1378, 1381 (Md. Ct. App. 1981)
(an interpretation that is fair and reasonable is preferred to one that leads to an unreasonable
result); Dixon v. Gunter, 636 S.W2d 437, 441 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (an insurance contract
should not be given a forced, unnatural, or unreasonable construction that would extend or
restrict the policy beyond what is fairly within its terms, or that would lead to an absurd

conclusion or render the policy nonsensical or ineffective).
139. See, e.g., Fischer, supra note 1, at 174; William M. Lashner, A Common LawAlternative

to the Doctrineof Reasonable Expectationsin the ConstructionofInsurance Contracts, 57 N.Y.U. L.
Rav. 1175, 1196-97 (1982); Swisher, A Middle Ground Approach to Insurance ContractDisputes,
supra note 5, at 550-51 n.22, and 570 n.77; see generally ERIC
PLEMAN ON INSuRANCE LAW, § 8.6 at 418-19 (2d ed. 1996).

MILLs HOLMES, HOLMES'
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This important interpretive principle for standardized insurance contracts is found in Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 237, commentf
[A] party who adheres to the other party's standard terms does not assent to
a term if the other party had reason to believe that the adhering party would
not have accepted the agreement if he had known that the agreement contained the particular term. Such a belief or assumption may be shown by the
prior negotiations or inferred from the fact that the term is bizarre and oppressive, from the fact that it eviscerates the nonstandard terms explicitly
agreed to, or from the fact that it eliminates the dominant purpose of the
transaction. [This] inference is reinforced if the adhering party never had an
opportunity to read the term, or if it is illegible or otherwise hidden from
view.'o
Another equally important interpretive rule involving standardized insurance contracts of adhesion is that in order to further validate the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, such coverage will be liberally construed by the court, and any exclusion, exception, or limitation
to coverage therefore must be clearly, expressly, and unambiguously stated
in the insurance contract.' 4' This crucially important, but often overlooked,
interpretive rule provides additional protection to the insured in further
42
validating his or her reasonable expectation to coverage.
These final interpretive rules under a traditional, contractually based
doctrine of reasonable expectations realistically recognize that "provisions
of mass-produced standardized agreements are not automatically given ef140.

RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF

CONTRACTS

§

237 cmt. f (1981).

141. See, e.g., Farmer's Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bakke, 619 E2d 885 (10th Cir. 1980)
(applying New Mexico law); Steamboat Dev. Corp. v. Bacjac Indus. Inc., 701 P.2d 127 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1985); Northwest Airlines Inc. v.Globe Indem. Co., 225 N.W2d 831 (Minn. 1975).
See generally 2 CoucH

ON INSURANCE

§ 15:93 (Mark S. Rhodes ed., rev. 2d ed. 1984) ("A risk

that comes naturally within the terms of a policy is not deemed to be excluded unless the
intent of the parties to exclude it appears clearly [in the policy].") (citing numerous case
authority supporting this interpretive rule). As a corollary to this interpretive rule, a clearly
drafted and unambiguous exclusion or limitation to coverage generally will be enforced by
most courts:
[TIn the majority of cases, even in states enamored of the [Keeton] reasonable expectation
approach, it appears that when insurers have drafted reasonably clear [exclusionary] language, it has been enforced by the courts. See, e.g., New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. PowerO-Peat, Inc., 907 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Minn. law) (enforcing CGL
exclusion for liability for advertising injury); Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d 987,
991 (Ida., 1980) (holding that insurer exclusion for loss "arising out of riot, civil commotion or mob action" prevents coverage of promoter for loss suffered by concessionaires from unruly mob); Cochran v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 271 N.W2d 331, 333 (Neb.
1978) (upholding insurer exclusion of theft coverage unless "visible marks of forcible
entry" present on exterior of vehicle when a car was taken with a "jiggle key" that left
no marks).
Stempel,supra note 21, at 824 n.106.
142. See generally Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach to Insurance Contract Disputes, supra
note 5, at 597-604.
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fect if they are at variance with the reasonable expectations of the party
who did not prepare the document," 143 and therefore, with standardized
insurance policies at least, "courts have been less- likely to exclude boilerplate from the contract but are more likely to interpret the standardized
term narrowly or in accord with the policyholder's viewpoint in order to
maximize coverage. ' 144
VI. JUDICIAL UTILIZATION OF A CONTRACTUALLY BASED
DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS REMAINS A REALISTIC
AND.VIABLE WAY TO SETTLE MOST INSURANCE CONTRACT
• DISPUTES TODAY

A contractually based insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations
has been successfully developed and adopted by the vast majority of American courts over the past half century, predating the more modem Keeton
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations by at least three or four
45
decades. 1
In order to recognize the reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage within this overarching contractual context, various rules of insurance contract interpretation were formulated, recognized, and incorporated into the case law of most American jurisdictions, including: (1) the
contra proferentem doctrine of ambiguities; (2) contract unconscionability
and public policy defenses; (3) the application of certain equitable remedies
such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and reformation of contract; and (4) additional interpretive rules applicable to
standardized insurance contracts of adhesion.
Over the past six decades, these interpretive rules have been applied by
utilizing one of two competing jurisprudential approaches: (1) a more classical, formalistic, and textual contractual approach as propounded by Professor Samuel Williston and his legal disciples; or (2) a more fimctionalistic
and contextual "reasonable expectations" contractual approach as propounded by Professor Arthur Corbin and his legal disciples. Although the
143. 1 CotBIN ON CONTRACTS, supra note 129, § 1.1 (1993 rev. ed.).
144. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DIsPUrEs, supra note 1, § 4.06[d]. Concludes
Professor Stempel:
The courts and to some extent the legislatures have made a peace pact with the commercial community, particularly the insurance industry. Standardized contracts are allowed to flourish and will be enforced so long as they are sufficiently clear and fair, and
without trickery accompanying the sale. However, the legislature may be more inclined
to regulate insurance and other areas heavy with adhesion contracting. Courts view adhesion contracts, particularly insurance contracts, with somewhat more scrutiny in determining whether to invoke any special judicial doctrines [of insurance contract interpretation].
Id. at 4-50.
145. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
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Williston and Corbin schools of insurance contract interpretation continue
to spar contentiously over the fundamental question of whether "plain
meaning" realistically can be ascertained from the "four corners" of an
insurance contract, Williston on Contractsand Corbinon Contractsshare many
more similarities than differences in analyzing and resolving insurance contract disputes. Both Williston and Corbin believed, for example, that important interpretive contract rules and remedies existed, based upon underlying rationales of contractual fairness, when extrinsic evidence, parole
evidence, and the parties' reasonable expectations to coverage could, when
appropriate, override clear textual provisions within a standardized insurance contract.
Neither Professor Williston nor Professor Corbin were prepared to
"throw out the contractual baby with the bath water." Both endeavored to
construct their interpretive rules within well-recognized parameters of
American contract law. It remained for Professor Robert Keeton in his
1970 Harvard Law Review article to construct a new and revolutionary
reasonable expectations model of consumer rights at variance not only with
the policy language, but also with these generally recognized contractual
rights, remedies, and obligations.
VII. THE MODERN KEETON INSURANCE LAW DOCTRINE OF
REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS

The insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations was not a new concept' 46 when Professor Keeton wrote his influential law review article in
1970, 147 although most courts and commentators now tend to analyze, support, or criticize the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations only
from Professor Keeton's doctrinal perspective. 4 This failure to adequately
distinguish between a more traditional, contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations on the one hand and Professor Keeton's 1970 "rights
at variance with the policy provisions" doctrine on the other hand, has led
to a number of confusing interpretive conclusions in trying to ascertain
exactly which reasonable expectations doctrine has been adopted-or has
not been adopted-in the various jurisdictions. 149
146. See, e.g., supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text; supra notes 20-144 and accompanying text.
147. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights, supra note 1.
148. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
149. For example, two commentators have stated that no fewer than thirty-eight states
"have recognized .some variation of the reasonable expectations doctrine." OSTRAGER AND
NEWMAN, supra note 1, § 1.03[b] at 22. However, a large number of these judicial decisions
cited by Ostrager and Newman actually deal with ambiguous insurance contracts and other
contractually based interpretive rules, rather than with Professor Keeton's reasonable expec-
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Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations is based upon a
two-pronged rationale: (1) that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in an insurance contract; and (2) that the reasonable
expectations of the insurance applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of an insurance contract should be honored, even though a
painstaking study of the policy provisions contractually would have negated

those expectations.1 0
The first principle of Professor Keeton's reasonable expectation doctrine, that an insurer should be denied any unconscionable advantage in
an insurance contract, was firmly based on the depth and breadth of a more
traditional, contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations involving elements of contract ambiguity, unconscionability, and waiver and estatons doctrine. See, e.g., Swisher, A Middle Ground Approach to Insurance Contract Disputes,
supra note 5, at 561. See also Stempel, Unmet Expectations,supra note 1, at 192 ("Commentators
listing up to 38 states as approving the reasonable expectations doctrine characterize the
[Keeton] reasonable expectations approach too broadly.").
In his 1990 assessment of the reasonable expectations doctrine after two decades, Professor
Roger Henderson opined that "[als many as sixteen states may be viewed as having adopted
the [Keeton] doctrine, but it is not clear whether every court intended to embrace the broadest
formulation." Henderson, supra note 1, at 825 n.5. According to Professor Henderson, ten
states arguably had adopted the Keeton reasonable expectation doctrine by 1990: Alabama,
Alaska, Arizona, California, Iowa, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, and New
Jersey. Six additional jurisdictions-Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island-may or may not have adopted the Keeton reasonable expectation
doctrine, but "the decisions from these six jurisdictions are not entirely free from ambiguity
themselves and require [further] analysis." Id. at 828-34.
Today, however, only a handful of jurisdictions have actually adopted the "pure" version of
Professor Keeton's "rights at variance with the policy language" reasonable expectations
doctrine:

[Tihe number of jurisdictions that has adopted [the] "pure" [rights at variance with the
policy language] version of the Keeton [reasonable expectations] doctrine is relatively
small, numbering approximately a half-dozen. It includes states generally regarded as
more progressive and favorable to consumers and claimants: California, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and the District of Columbia. Also appearing at least one time to endorse
the full dress form of the [Keeton] reasonable expectations doctrine are Hawaii, Idaho,
Iowa, Minnesota, and Nevada. Today, however, Idaho, Iowa, and Pennsylvania have since
disapproved the pure [Keeton] reasonable expectations doctrine and instead appear to
use [traditional contractual] expectations analysis only when contested policy language
is ambiguous or otherwise problematic. Minnesota does not require ambiguous language
as a trigger for expectations analysis but does require that the exclusionary language at
issue be in some way hidden or surprising to the policyholder. New Jersey is seen by
some commentators as similarly having moved from pure [Keeton] reasonable expectations analysis to expectations as a tool for resolving ambiguous language and then back
again.
Stempel, Unmet Expectations,supra note 1, at 193-95. But see Croskey, supra note 1, at 47073 (arguing that since 1990 California courts no longer use the doctrine of reasonable expectations to justify a broad, proinsured rule of construction, but instead apply a more traditional, contractually based "middle ground" interpretive approach to insurance contract
disputes). See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992).
150. Keeton, InsuranceLaw Risks, supra note 1, at 963-64. See also supra notes 8-15 and
accompanying text.
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toppel principles.'' Indeed, Professor Keeton wrote that this unconscionability principle "explains much that is called waiver or estoppel in
insurance law, in circumstances involving neither voluntary relinquishment
nor detrimental reliance-the essence of waiver and estoppel respectively.
It also accounts for most of the distinctive controls over defenses based on
warranty, representation or concealment... [and] the doctrine of election."' 52 As Professor Mark Rahdert explains:
With nearly thirty years of accumulated hindsight, one is tempted to regard
this unconscionability version of the reasonable expectations principle as representing a fairly modest development. As its champion Professor Keeton himself demonstrated, the doctrine is firmly rooted in both common law and longstanding judicial practice.' 53 It grows naturally from the principles of legal
realism that have enjoyed wide acceptance in our legal system for over half a
century. And it reflects the proconsumer orientation that has animated much
commercial law development in the post-World War II period of American
law. Just as importantly, it does not significantly challenge the primary [traditional contractual] assumption that the language of the insurance policy sets
the terms of the bargain; rather it treats that assumption as a basic guiding
of contract fairness may require occarule, to which, however, the objective
54
sional judicially crafted exceptions.1

A majority of contemporary courts and commentators, thereforewhether they be proponents of a more formalistic' or a more functionalistic 15 6 interpretive approach to insurance contract disputes-are
able to recognize and apply this unconscionability variant of Professor Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine in resolving insurance coverage
disputes.' 57
151. Professor Robert Jerry notes, for example, that Professor Keeton "discovered" his
doctrine "in the more traditional [contractual] doctrines with which lawyers are more familiar
and comfortable." JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW, supra note 1, § 25D at 144-45.
See also supra notes 21-144 and accompanying text.
152. Keeton, Insurance Law Risks, supra note 1, at 963-64.
153. Citing to Keeton, Insurance Law Risks, supra note 1, at 963-65, 974-77.
154. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisited, supra note 1, at 130-31.
155. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 85-104 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 107-17 and accompanying text.
157. I agree with Professor Rahdert's assessment of Professor Keeton's unconscionability
principle, although Professor Rahdert apparently believes that I am among those commentators who are opposed to the adoption of Professor Keeton's unconscionability principle.
Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Revisted, supra note 1, at 131 n.70. However, my criticism of
Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations for "generating uncertainty by deviating from the express contract terms, and for being applied by the courts in an inconsistent
and uneven manner" was primarily addressed at Professor Keeton's second doctrinal principle
of "rights at variance with the policy language." See Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach to
Insurance ContractDisputes, supra note 5, at 552. I have little quarrel with Professor Keeton's
unconscionability variant, since it parallels so closely a more traditional contractually based
reasonable expectations unconscionability doctrine. See generally supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
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The second principle of Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations, however, has been much more controversial: that the reasonable
expectations of the insured should be honored, even though a "painstaking
study" of the policy provisions contractually would have negated those
expectations.'
Criticism of this "rights at variance with the policy language" principle in its "strong" form 59 has been threefold. First, under
this principle, the insurance policy need not be interpreted according to
its contractual language-which is anathema to a formalistic theory of
insurance contract interpretation. 16 0 Second, those courts that purportedly
do apply this "rights at variance expectations" principle have been unable
to agree on what specific factors actually constitute such a reasonable expectation of coverage, and what factors do not.'61 Third, a growing number
of courts and commentators have questioned the underlying doctrinal justification purportedly supporting this "rights at variance" interpretive ap62
proach to insurance coverage disputes.
158. Keeton, Insurance Law Risks, supra note 1, at 963-64. The courts also have split on
how "painstaking" this judicial "study" should be. See Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsReconsidered, supra note 1, at 335-36.
159. Professor Mark Rahdert describes this Keeton "rights at variance with the policy
language" principle that would confer on the courts "substantial new powers to set forth the
contours of coverage" as the "strong" application of the doctrine. A "weaker" reading of this
doctrine "would do little more than generate a new variant of the ambiguity principle." Professor Rahdert concludes that it "seems from Professor Keeton's analysis that he preferred
the stronger view of his formula" although "courts that have adopted the reasonable expectations principle, however, have not always shared this broad interpretation." Rahdert, Reasonable Expections Reconsidered, supra note 1, at 335-36.
160. See, e.g., WINDT, supra note 1, at 376. Windt states:
The [Keeton] reasonable expectation rule, therefore, abandons the general contract principle that the insured's legitimate expectations are necessarily governed and limited by
the terms of the policy. That principle will, instead, be applied only when it is fair to do
so. As a result, in a proper case, an insured may be held to be entitled to coverage despite
unambiguous language in the policy to the contrary.
Id.; see also supra note 13 and accompanying text.
161. See Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsReconsidered, spra note 1, at 335. Rahdert states:
The Keeton formula gives no hint at what factors other than the policy provisions courts
might use to define the "terms" of the insurance arrangement, or how the courts are to
measure the force of these external factors against the force of restrictive policy provisions to determine which should prevail in any given instance.
Id.; see also Abraham, Judge-MadeLaw, supra note 1, at 1153. Abraham notes:
The courts [following the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations] have employed
the expectations principle in cases where the insured's expectation of coverage was probably real and reasonable. They have also employed it where an expectation of coverage
was less probable, but the policy's denial of coverage seemed unfair. Finally, they have
relied on the principle even where an expectation of coverage was improbable and the
denial of coverage would not appear unfair. In short, the [Keeton] judicial concept of an
"expectation" of coverage is not a monolithic one.

Id.
162. See Thomas; supra note 1, at 333 (concluding that the Keeton reasonable expectations
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Accordingly, as Professor Rahdert correctly observes, the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations "represents not a single concept but a bundle of related ideas" that "can be invoked in at least four different ways":
For the most part, courts rely on the reasonable expectations of the insured
(a) as an interpretive device for ascertaining the meaning of policy language.
This use of the principle, which is by far the most common, fits comfortably
within traditional precepts of insurance law and the common law tradition. It
is closely aligned with what I call the "ambiguity principle," the time-honored
invocation of the maxim contraproferentem that courts routinely and universally
apply to interpret "ambiguous" insurance policy language. This use of the
reasonable expectations concept as an interpretive device really should not be
controversial.
On fewer occasions, but still fairly often, courts employ reasonable expectations (b) to adjust contract terms that, as applied to the insured's situation,
would otherwise have an unfair or "unconscionable" effect.... While this idea
might have been controversial thirty years ago, it really ought not to be so
today. ... [B]y now it is a relatively longstanding and accepted power of the
courts that has put out fairly deep common-law roots. In an insurance context,
it is also typically not a very big leap from traditional thinking, especially in
the application of the ambiguity principle, because in most instances what
makes the insured's expectation "reasonable" is that it rests on a plausible interpretation of the policy language....
On still fewer occasions, courts employ the reasonable expectations principle
(c) to avoid enforcing policy language that, no matter how clearly expressed
or fully explained, would defeat what the court believes are the essential objectives of the insurance policy. In these instances, which occur quite rarely,
the language unambiguously fails to support the insured's interpretation, but
in the court's judgment it is so completely at odds with the basic purpose the
insurance policy was intended to serve that enforcing it would work substantial
injustice. The question whether courts should have the power to do this has
remained controversial; how controversial it should be depends heavily on
one's jurisprudential perspective toward contract adjudication, and the insurance-law facet of this question is part of a larger contract-law debate between
formalists and functionalists, legal economists and consumer protectionists
that has been raging for the last decade. The fate of this version of the reasonable expectations idea is likely to hang in the balance of these contracttheory culture wars.
doctrine "rests on dubious assumptions" since "consumer research and empirical data tends
to show that the insureds do not rationally evaluate insurance information or arrive at specific
expectations of coverage"); see also Fischer, supra note 1, at 179-80 (concluding that the
Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations "tells us so little about why courts decide coverage
disputes the way they do" with its primary deficiency being "the muting of decisional accountability"). The doctrine of reasonable expectations, according to Professor Fischer,
"needs to shed its disguise of policyholder expectations and sustain itself on its true grounding
of insurance as a public good and the corollary that coverage decisions should be based on
public good [rather than policyholder expectations]" Id.
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Finally, in what for emphasis I will term a "truly tiny trickle" of very, very
rare instances (so rare that they approach zero), courts may invoke the reasonable expectations concept (d) to avoid policy limitations that would contravene important overriding public policies regarding assured compensation.
In these cases, the court is not so much concerned with the dynamics of the
arrangement between insurer and insured as it is with making insurance
"work" for the good of others who depend on it, or for the good of society.
Only the more aggressive uses of the reasonable expectation principle [particularly uses (c) and (d)] ought to stir sharp controversy. Given the infrequency
with which these aggressive uses of the reasonable expectations idea occur, one
is tempted to characterize the fight over them as something of a tempest in a
teapot. The vast majority of reasonable expectations applications ought not to
be perceived as threatening, in any substantial way, to either the traditions of
insurance law adjudication or the ability of insurers to prescribe the limits of
163
coverage for their policies.
If Professor Rahdert's analysis of Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations is a fair, comprehensive, and realistic discussion of the
four ways in which the Keeton doctrine may be judicially invoked and
applied by most courts today, as I believe it is, then it is also an excellent
illustration of how a traditional and a modern consensus approach to the
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations can successfully co-exist
in contemporary insurance coverage disputes. Under either the more traditional, contractually based interpretive approach,'- or under a more
modern functionalistic Keetonian interpretive approach, 6 , the final result,
in the vast majority of insurance coverage disputes, will be fundamentally
the same, even though the courts' interpretive rationales may differ in
reaching and justifying these similar results.166 Like the Williston school
163. Rahdert, ReasonableErpectationsRevisited, supra note 1,at 112-14. Professor Rahdert,
however, subsequently cautions:
Yet from another perspective the controversiality of the reasonable expectations principle
seems well-deserved, because even its mildly aggressive applications challenged some of
the most time-honored contract-law boilerplate on which much of the basic structure of
insurance law depends.... Since courts and commentators are, for the most part, quite
unwilling to overhaul insurance law in its entirety or to rethink its most basic assumptions, they have found it difficult to reconcile any but the most tepid applications of the
reasonable expectations idea with the other insurance law principles that routinely guide
their decisions. The result is a continuing sense of instability about the role that reasonable expectations ought to play in insurance analysis.
Id. at 114.
164. See supra notes 21-144 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
166. See Rahdert, Reasonable Erpectations Revisited, supra note 1, at 114 n.18 (citing to
Swisher, JudicialRationalesin Insurance Law, supra note 5, at 1050-5 1):
Professor Swisher's formal/substantive dichotomy actually cuts across all the different
uses of the reasonable expectations principle I have identified. Even when a court takes
the modest step of using the insured's reasonable expectations as a guide to discerning
the meaning of policy language, it is to some extent acknowledging the fact that the
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versus the Corbin school of contract interpretation,167 a traditional contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations and the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations, on closer analysis, possess many more
interpretive similarities than differences.
VIII. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE KEETON
DOCTRINAL APPROACH

It is beyond the scope of this present article to comprehensively analyze
and discuss all the doctrinal strengths and weaknesses of Professor Keeton's
insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations, since a number of very
able legal commentators have already debated this contentious topic, supporting 168 and criticizing 169 Professor Keeton's interpretive approach. Instead, I will briefly summarize the most recent legal commentary and
trends, and the most recent judicial retrenchment-and rejection-of
Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations to date.
In a recent symposium on The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations After Three Decades,70 policyholder attorneys Eugene Anderson
and James Fournier argue that to a policyholder, an insurance policy "is
not a widget, and it is not simply a contract to pay money." It is a product,' 7'
and a significant part of this insurance product "is peace of mind and an

expectation that the policyholder is protected."' 72 Thus, they reason,
"courts apply the reasonable expectations doctrine as one way to minimize
policy is a contract of adhesion, the terms of which are determined unilaterally by the
insurer. To this extent it is departing from the formal, Willistonian approach to contract
construction, which at least in pure form would treat the parties' relative negotiating
strength as irrelevant.
Id.
167. See supra notes 86-126 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Abraham,Judge-MadeLaw, supra note 1; Anderson and Fournier, supranote
1; Fett, supra note 1; Henderson, Reasonable Expectations After Two Decades, supra note 1;
Henderson, Forces Outside Insurance Law, supra note 1; Jerry, Insurance, Contract,and Doctrine,
supra note 1; Mayhew, supra note 1; Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, supra note
1; Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsRevisited, supra note 1; Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra
note 1.
169. See, e.g., Fadel, supra note 1; Fischer, supra note 1; Ingram, supra note 1; Lashner,
supra note 1; Leitner, supranote 1; Lucas, supra note 1; Popik and Quackenbos, supra note 1;
Perlet, supra note 1; Squires, supra note 1; Thomas, supra note 1; Ware, supra note 1.
170. Symposium on the Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable ExpectationsAfter Tbree Decades,
5 CorNN. INs. L.J. 1-473 (1998-1999).
171. See Anderson and Fournier, supra note 1, at 379 n.130.
172. Id. at 379-80. See alsojerry,supra note 72 (stating that insurers and their agents often
emphasize the catastrophic effects of loss and the "peace of mind" that insurance provides
when attempting to convince a prospective insured to purchase insurance coverage);
D'Ambrosio v. Penn. Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 396 A.2d 780, 786 (Pa. Super. 1978) ("The insurer's
promise to insured to 'simplify his life,' to put him in 'good hands,' to back him with 'a piece
of the rock,' or to be 'on his side' hardly suggests that the insurer will abandon the insured
in his time of need.")
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insurance industry control and to more fully protect the policyholder's
rights as the purchaser of an insurance product."' 73 Nevertheless, a majority
of courts today still continue to utilize an insurance-as-contract baseline
for resolving insurance sales/coverage disputes, rather than an insuranceas-product rationale.11 But, assuming that insurance policies do gain more
judicial recognition in the near future as a "product" rather than as a "contract" based upon an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,'
the probable remedy would still arguably sound in contract under the Uni76
form Commercial Code.
On the other hand, insurance defense attorneys Susan Popik and Carol
Quackenbos argue that reasonable expectations after thirty years is a "failed
doctrine" since, from the beginning, "there has been a striking lack of
agreement among the courts and commentators as to what the reasonable
expectations doctrine is, how it should be applied, or when it should be

invoked."1177

Arguing that Professor Keeton's reasonable expectations doctrine is unnecessary in light of other existing contractual remedies, 178 the authors
173. Anderson and Fournier, supra note 1, at 337. Applying such a "strong" Keetonian
reasonable expectations doctrine, they believe, would help curb unfair insurance industry
control and domination over policyholders, and help curb "opportunistic breaches" on the
part of insurance companies. Id. at 377-85.
174. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Construing the Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories,
and Insurance Contract Damages, 72 TEx. L. Rav. 1395, 1417 (1994) ("The insurance-as-contract story is typically the baseline [for judging an insurance relationship]. Many, if not most
courts-whether deciding in favor of insurance companies or insureds-rely heavily on a
straightforward interpretation of the insurance company's printed form.") See also JEFFREY
STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAw AND STRATEGY FOR INSURERS AND
POLICYHOLDERS 298 (1994) ("Although insurance marketing involves sales force solicitation,

mass advertising, and efforts to build a secure, positive image rather than to promote a given
coverage scheme or contract language, the insurance policy still figures prominently in the
manner in which insurance is usually sold.").
175. See supra note 170.
176. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-315 (1966).
177. Popik and Quackenbos, supra note 1, at 427. See also Ware, supranote 1, at 1466-67
("Construing an insurance policy to protect the insured's 'reasonable expectations' means
different things to different courts.... [The different versions of the doctrine] form a rough
continuum from purported adherence to the policy's language to open disregard of the written
contract."); Henderson, Reasonable ExpectationsAfter Two Decades, supra note 1, at 823 ("Even
after two decades, there still seems to exist a great deal of uncertainty as to the doctrinal
content and when the principle may be invoked, including most of the jurisdictions that have
professed to have adopted it.").
178. Popik and Quackenbos, supra note 1, at 447-48:
There will always, of course, be circumstances in which a determination of the parties'
intent cannot be made from the language of the policy alone. In those instances, the
existing rules of contract interpretation, such as waiver, estoppel, unconscionability, and
contra proferentem are all that is necessary to interpret the contract-and even to protect
insureds from overreaching insurers. Applicable to all contracts, these equitable principles do not suffer from the same infirmities as the reasonable expectations doctrine and
are thus preferable to that doctrine, with its unavoidable vagaries and uncertainties.
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conclude that despite thirty years of effort "neither courts nor commentators have been able to provide a real analytic framework for the doctrine.
The inescapable conclusion may be that it is just not possible to do so179
and that perhaps it is time to stop trying."'
One of the most thought-provoking and comprehensive defenses of Professor Keeton's doctrine of reasonable expectations in recent years appears
in a 1998 article written by Professor Jeffrey Stempel. 110 Briefly, Professor
Stempel's thesis is that the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine has
never really been fully utilized as an analytical tool, and has not yet been
fully deployed in a thoughtful and comprehensive manner. In large part,
this underutilization of reasonable expectations thinking, Professor Stempel believes, has resulted from judicial fear of creating new legal rights "at
variance" with clearly worded insurance policy language, rather than properly utilizing the doctrine as a potential tool for addressing uncertain policy
language and application."' For example, Professor Stempel notes that:
Many courts had difficulty embracing a concept that they regarded as turning
too quickly away from the traditional contract law principles positing that
contract language should be enforced as written if it is sufficiently clear. These
courts were willing to consider policyholder expectations only if policy language was ambiguous. Other courts were willing to utilize the Keeton form
of reasonable expectations analysis to overcome clear text, but only where

179. Id. at 449.
180. See Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 1, at 182, stating, "I hope to explain to
some degree the doctrine's seemingly sudden emergence, attraction to academics but resistance from elements of bench and bar, early growth, subsequent retreat, current status, and
continuing controversy."
181. Stempel, Unmet Expectations,supra note 1, at 183. Professor Stempel continues:
Properly seen, however, the reasonable expectations doctrine, even in its strong "rights
at variance" form, is actually consistent with the prevailing jurisprudential ethos [of judicial restraint] because of the context of insurance coverage. Determining the "correct"
meaning of an insurance policy inevitably requires not only a sharp focus on policy text
but also full consideration of the reasonable expectations of both insurerandinsured, even
where those expectations to some extent run counter to the text, and certainly when text
is unclear, insufficiently certain, or applied to unanticipated situations. Contrary to the
assertions of some courts and commentators, strong judicial invocation of the reasonable
expectations concept poses no threat to separation of powers and little serious obstacle
toward vindicating the intent of the parties to the insurance contract and the purpose of
the insuring agreement.
Viewed comprehensively, the reasonable expectations of the parties to an insurance
contract can be used not only to construe ambiguous policy text or to overcome clear
text violative of the insured's reasonable expectations, but also to serve as a check on
absurd hyperliteral interpretations of policy text. In addition, the reasonable expectations
approach can assist courts in determining whether policy provisions are ambiguous or
whether "painstaking" study of the policy suggests a clear meaning for problematic text.
All of these varieties of the reasonable expectations approach merit more frequent, more
expansive, and more self-consciously reflective use by the courts.
Id. at 183-84.
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[policy] language favorable to insurers was complex, hidden, arguably unfairly
surprising, or where the insured was a consumer or small business.
Courts have for decades and perhaps centuries been using the policyholder's
understanding of the policy as a tool for resolving coverage disputes. However,
the conventional wisdom held that these considerations only applied if the
policy language at issue was unclear or unconscionable. Keeton both debunked
this conventional wisdom and attempted to synthesize case law finding coverage despite policy language favorable to insurers denying coverage. According to Keeton, these cases could not be solely explained by reference to traditional doctrines such as unconscionability, waiver, estoppel, or construction
of ambiguities in favor of the policyholder. Rather, the common thread of these
cases was the court's willingness to provide coverage consistent with the objectively reasonable expectations of the policyholder even if policy text read
literally would foreclose coverage. 82
Unfortunately, however, neither Professor Keeton nor Professor Stempel nor numerous other commentators and courts over the past thirty years
have been able to persuasively explain and justify the parameters of such
an overarching, understandable, and reasonably predictable reasonable expectations doctrine of "rights at variance with the policy language," as most
of the doctrine's critics and supporters alike readily admit.' 3 This conundrum, in conjunction with the resurgence of legal formalism in American

182. Id. at 189-90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) also contains a
model version of the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine that does not require an ambiguity in the policy to utilize extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent. Section 211 states with
respect to standard form contracts:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise
manifests assent to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts the writing as an
integrated agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing,
(2) Such a writing is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those similarly
situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of the standard terms of
the writing.
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent
would not do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not
part of the agreement.
Id. Thus, under this Restatement version of the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine, terms
"beyond the range of reasonable expectations" are not enforceable against the adhering party.
183. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f (1981). To date, however, only
one court has expressly adopted section 211 of the Restatement in an insurance law context.
See Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388 (Ariz. 1984).
For a discussion of the application of this Restatement version of reasonable expectations to
the Keeton "rights at variance" doctrine of reasonable expectations, see Cubbage, supra note
1. See supra notes 12, 13, 160-62, 177, 179 and accompanying text. See also WINDT, supra
note 1, at 376 ("Unfortunately, however, the courts have had little success in formulating a
test for determining when equity necessitates that the [Keeton] reasonable expectations rule
be applied."); Henderson, Reasonable ExpectationsAfter Two Decades, supra note 1, at 837-38
("even after two decades, there still seems to exist a great deal of uncertainty as to the doctrinal
content and when the [reasonable expectations] principle may be invoked, including most of
the jurisdictions that have professed to have adopted it").
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jurisprudence today, 84 helps explain the widespread judicial reluctance to
embrace Professor Keeton's "strong"'' 8 "rights at variance" doctrine of
86
reasonable expectations.
Consequently, in the 1980s and 1990s, and as we cross over that fabled
bridge into the twenty-first century, the Keeton doctrine of reasonable
expectations-at least in its "strong". "rights at variance with the policy
language" variant-has suffered a significant decline in its theoretical credibility and its practical application. Only a small handful of states currently
recognize the Keeton doctrine in its "strong" variant, 87 and various proponents of the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine in the past, such
as Professor Kenneth Abraham'88 and Professor Mark Rahdert, 89 now con184. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text. See also Stempel, Unmet Expectations,
supra note 1, at 263-77:
The reasonable expectations doctrine is regarded (wrongly in my view) as overly liberal,
result-oriented, and anti-free market anti-freedom of contract, and even at odds with the
norm of judicial deference to the legislature. Republican-appointed judges and conservative judges are generally reluctant to embrace a doctrine with this sort of image. But
...
the retreat from reasonable expectations or the reluctance to further embrace it stems
from a more metapolitical aspect of our culture than the relative strengths of the political
parties or their primary ideologies. Rather, the growth of reasonable expectations analysis
has been pared to a large degree by the prevailing view that judges must generally be
restrained strict constructionists who do as little as possible to interfere with textual
instruments and markets.
Id. at 266.
185. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
186. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 21, at 828:
[A number] of the states appear receptive to the underlying notion of vindicating the
reasonable expectations of the policyholder but stop short of treating the notion as a
distinct doctrine or principle for decision. Instead, these courts introduce reasonable
expectation thinking into their opinions, often combining it with the ambiguity doctrine,
and relatively broad notions of promissory and equitable estoppel, waiver, unconscionability, and public policy review, but stop short of using the policyholders' expectations,
however reasonable, to override policy language viewed as clear.
Id. see also Stempel, Unmet Expectations,supra note 1, at 183:
A complete and open embrace of the pure version of the doctrine as enunciated in judge
Keeton's famous article-which expressly provides for finding coverage consistent with
the objectively reasonable expectations of the policyholder even where those expectations
are contradicted by apparently clear policy language-is viewed by much of the legal
and political mainstream as too inconsistent with the prevailing American paradigm of
judicial restraint, strict construction of disputed texts, and minimal government involvement in market activity. Some of this resistance to reasonable expectations is the product
of an unrealistic reification of the prevailing American politico-legal philosophy of judicial restraint. Some of the resistance results from legitimate concerns about political
lawmaking less tethered to text (of insurance policies, contracts, statutes, treaties, or
documents in general). But although excessively reified and deified, the judicial restraint
paradigm is unlikely to shift significantly unless American society incurs radical change.
The resilience of the judicial restraint construct is understandable in that, for the most
part, it has proven sound and apt for the American system.

Id.
187. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
188. See Abraham,Judge-Made Law, supra note 1.
189. See Rahdert, Reasonable ExpectationsReconsidered, supra note 1.
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cede only a very limited role for the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations in the vast majority of insurance coverage disputes today. 90 Finally,
two recent commentators, Professor Jeffrey Thomas and Professor James
Fischer, have both seriously questioned the underlying doctrinal justification and rationale for Professor Keeton's "rights at variance" doctrine of
reasonable expectations. 191
This contemporary reassessment and rejection, dilution, and decline in
the theoretical justification, and the practical application, of the Keeton
doctrine of reasonable expectations is also mirrored in a current trend of
judicial reassessment-and rejection-of the Keeton "rights at variance"
reasonable expectations doctrine over the past twenty years.
For example, prior to 1990, California viewed the reasonable expectations doctrine as a viable rationale for the application of a broad proinsured
interpretive approach in resolving insurance coverage disputes. 192 Since
1990, however, and largely based upon the AIU 193and Bank of the West'94
cases, California courts now apply a more contractually oriented interpre9
tive approach to insurance coverage disputes.'1
Pennsylvania,196 Idaho, 197

190. See, e.g., Abraham, A Regulative Ideal, supra note 1, at 61-62:
The [Keeton] expectations "doctrine" is limited to the point of being of minor significance. For a number of reasons, this doctrine rarely determines or even directly influences the outcome of insurance coverage disputes. First, the doctrine has been adopted
in only one-third of the states. In most states, therefore, the doctrine does not and cannot
affect the outcome of a coverage dispute. Second, as Roger C. Henderson has so effectively shown, the courts in a number of states that have [purportedly] adopted the doctrine probably do not fully appreciate what they have done and may not adhere fully to
their stated position .... Third, my own reading of the case law leads me to conclude
that even in the states that have adopted and continue to adhere to the expectations
doctrine, the courts rarely invoke the doctrine in practice. Very few cases turn on application of the doctrine. Finally, the doctrine is even more rarely invoked in commercial
coverage disputes than in consumer cases.
Id. Professor Abraham concludes, however, that "even as the expectations 'doctrine' remains
in obscurity, the 'principle' at the heart of the doctrine [as a regulative ideal] has a powerful
effect on the broader normative posture of insurance law." Id. at 68. Professor Abraham's
observations are consistent with Professor Mark Rahdert's similar observations of a "tiny
trickle of very, very rare instances (so rare that they approach zero)" where a "strong" Keeton
"rights at variance" doctrine would arguably apply. See generally supra note 163 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171-72 (Cal. 1966); Insurance Co.
of North America v. Sam Harris Constr. Co., 583 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Cal. 1978); White v.
Western Title Ins. Co., 710 P.2d 309, 314 (Cal. 1985). See also Croskey, supra note 1, at 45359.
193. 799 P.2d 1253 (Cal. 1990).
194. 833 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1992).
195. See Croskey, supra note 1, at 472-73:
This new approach by California's Supreme Court represents the adoption of something
very close to what Professor Swisher calls the "middle ground interpretive approach to
insurance contract disputes" [citing to Peter Nash Swisher, JudicialInterpretationsof In-
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and Iowa198 also have recently disapproved the "strong" Keeton "rights at

variance" reasonable expectations approach that they once arguably embraced, and instead now appear to use a "weaker" expectations analysis
only when contested insurance policy language is ambiguous or otherwise
problematic. 199
A growing number of other courts have expressly rejected the "strong"
"rights at variance" Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations. 00 For example, the Florida Supreme Court in 1998, in its landmark Deni Associates
case,2 0 ' declared:
surance Contract Disputes: Toward a Realistic Middle Ground Approach, 59 OHIo ST. LJ.
543, 634 (1996)]. The insurance contract will be interpreted according to general principles of contract construction and clear and plain meaning will be enforced according
to the ordinary and popular usage of the words utilized; but if ambiguity still remains it
will be resolved by looking to the insured's objectively reasonable expectations and then
only if a construction in favor of coverage is consistent with those expectations will the
disputed policy language be construed against the insurer. At least from this judge's
perspective, this was a sea change of considerable significance.
Id; see also Blum, The California Supreme Court: Toward a Radical Middle, 77 A.B.A.J. 48, 50
(January, 1991):
The court has also expressed a preference for deferring policy judgments affecting important social issues and commercial relationships to legislative decision making. Some
court watchers see this as a healthy return to the proper role of the court as an interpreter,
rather than a maker of law. Others... think the court is too deferential....
"In the area of the common law," says former Justice Grodin, "I think the court's conservatism is reflected in the notion that it is unwise to expand liability ... [and] that
contract principles should be applied strictly and without regard, or with little regard,
for differences in bargaining power between the parties, and in a tendency toward the
insistence upon clear, bright lines and rules."

Id.
196. See, e.g., Standard Venetian Blind Co., 469 A.2d at 563 (suggesting that Pennsylvania
is now a "middle ground" reasonable expectations state, utilizing reasonable expectations in
combination with ambiguity analysis to resolve insurance coverage disputes involving ambiguous language). See also Tonkovic v. State Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 521 A.2d 920 (Pa. 1987)
(similar holding). These two cases are thus a judicial retrenchment from two earlier cases that
arguably recognized the "strong" Keeton "rights at variance" doctrine in Collisterv. Nationwide
Life Ins. Co., 388 A.2d 1346 (Pa. 1978), and Hionis v. Northern Mut. Ins. Co., 327 A.2d 363
(Pa. Super. 1974).
197. See, e.g., Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 600 P.2d 1387 (Idaho 1979) (rejecting the
reasonable expectations doctrine in any form, and expressly overruling the earlier case of
Corgatelliv. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 533 P.2d 737 (Idaho 1975)).
198. See, e.g., Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sandbulte, 302 N.W.2d 104 (Iowa 1981)
(moving away from a "strong" "rights at variance with the policy language" reasonable expectations approach, and requiring that the policy language be ambiguous, bizarre, or oppressive in order to provide coverage based on policyholder expectations).
199. See generally Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 1, at 191-95.
200. See, e.g., Menke v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 401 N.E.2d 539 (Ill. 1980); Bond Bros. v.
Robinson, 471 N.E.2d 1332 (Mass. 1984); Robbins Auto Parts v. Granite State Ins. Co., 435
A.2d 507 (N.H. 1981); Sterling Merchandise Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co., 506 N.E.2d 1192
(Ohio Ct. App. 1986); Allen v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798 (Utah 1992);
Ryan v. Harrison, 699 P.2d 230 (Wash. Ct. App. 1985); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Albany County School District, 763 P.2d 1255 (Wyo. 1988).
201. Deni Associates of Florida Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135
(Fla. 1998).
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We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations. There is no need
for it if the policy provisions are ambiguous because in Florida ambiguities are
construed against the insurer. To apply the doctrine to an unambiguous provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums
are charged. See SterlingMerchandise Co. v. HartfordIns. Co., 30 Ohio App. 3d
131, 506 N.E.2d 1192, 1197 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986) ("The reasonable expectation doctrine requires a court to rewrite an insurance contract which does
not meet popular expectations. Such rewriting is done regardless of the bargain
entered into by the parties to the contract.").
Construing insurance policies upon a determination as to whether the insured's subjective expectations are reasonable can only lead to uncertainty and
unnecessary litigation. As noted in Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty
Insurance Co., 839 P.2d 798, 803 (Utah, 1992):
Today, after more than twenty years of attention to the [Keeton] doctrine
[of reasonable expectations] in various forms by different courts, there is still
great uncertainty as to the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine, its scope,
and the details of its application. °2
Although the Deni case has been criticized by some commentators, 203
this recent judicial decision by the Florida Supreme Court nevertheless
illustrates the current legal trend in many American jurisdictions today of
severely restricting-or expressly rejecting-the Keeton reasonable expectations doctrine.2°4
Finally-and most curiously, after more than thirty years of contentious
debate-a majority of states still have not expressly adopted, or expressly
rejected, the Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations, and apparently
have chosen to ignore this jurisprudential brouhaha.0 Thus, as Professor
Kenneth Abraham observes:
[E]ven in the [small minority] of states where it is in force, the [Keeton reasonable] expectations doctrine is static. It is not developing, evolving, or
changing. There are very few if any decisions that apply the doctrine in a new
way or uncover unrecognized implications of prior applications. On the contrary, the expectations doctrine is going nowhere.
In short, the [Keeton reasonable] expectations [doctrine] is a weapon in the
insured's arsenal in the [very small] minority of states that have adopted it, and
is a threat to insurers in those states, but the doctrine is of minor significance.
202. Id. at 1140.
203. See, e.g., Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 1, at 223-45 ("Reasonable Expectations Comes to a Crossroad in Florida-and is driven into a ditch.").
204. See supra notes 182 -99 and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Abraham, A Regulative Ideal, supra note 1, at 60: "For over three decades
now, the courts of some states have followed the [Keeton] doctrine permitting them to honor
the reasonable expectations of the insured to coverage, notwithstanding clear policy language
to the contrary. Most courts, however, have either expressly rejected this doctrine or quietly
ignore it." Id; see also Swisher, A Middle GroundApproach to Insurance Contract Disputes, supra
note 5, at 554 n.34; Stempel, Unmet Expectations, supra note 1, at 223 n. 118.
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The doctrine should be taught in the classroom, employed by insureds where
possible, and anticipated as a potential threat by insurers. But the [Keeton]
26
doctrine is not an important feature on the landscape of insurance law.
IX. A REALISTIC CONSENSUS APPROACH TO THE INSURANCE LAW
DOCTRINE OF REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS
A realistic consensus approach to Professor Keeton's insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations-an approach shared by the overwhelming
majority of courts and legal commentators today-is that the "strong"
Keeton doctrine of reasonable expectations at variance with clear and unambiguous insurance policy language has been relegated-in theory and
in practice-to the status of an insignificant legal doctrine that is very
rarely ever applied, and only then by a small handful of courts. There are
a number of interrelated reasons why the Keeton doctrine of reasonable
expectations has experienced a much more limited judicial application than
various commentators initially had predicted: (1) under a "strong" Keeton
rights at variance with the insurance policy language doctrine, the insurance policy need not be interpreted according to its clear and unambiguous
contractual language-which is anathema to a more formalistic and textualistic theory of insurance contract interpretation; 07 (2) those courts that
purportedly do recognize this "strong" rights at variance with the policy
language principle have been unable to agree upon what specific factors
would constitute such a reasonable expectation of coverage, and what factors would not;20 8 and (3) a growing number of commentators have questioned the underlying doctrinal justification of reasonable policyholder expectations supporting this "rights at variance" interpretive approach to
insurance coverage disputes. 20 9 Consequently, the current judicial trend in
the vast majority of American states today-and the modem consensus
approach to the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations-is to
reassess and substantially restrict,2 10 reject,21' or basically ignore212 Professor Keeton's "rights at variance" reasonable expectations doctrine. For all
practical purposes, then, the Keeton "rights at variance" doctrine of reasonable expectations does not play an important role in the landscape of
contemporary American insurance law, 2' 3 and for all practical purposes it
is now a dead and discarded doctrine.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Abraham, A Regulative Ideal, supra note 1,at 63.
See supra notes 13 and 160 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161, 177, and 183 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 162 and 190 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 193 -99 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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The genius of Professor Keeton's 1970 law review article, 214 however,
was to successfully refocus the attention of American courts and legal commentators on those legal circumstances where the reasonable expectations
of the insured might indeed be at variance with the policy language, and
where the "plain meaning" of an insurance policy might not be dispositive
in achieving a just and equitable result. This was, after all, a doctrine largely
based upon Professor Corbin's pioneering "reasonable expectations" interpretive approach in Corbinon Contracts2 "-an
interpretive approach that
Professor Williston also recognized "when justice required it"21 6 -though
neither Corbin nor Williston was prepared to reject a number of wellestablished contractually based interpretive rules and remedies in order to
ascertain the parties' reasonable expectations to coverage.2" 7
The vast majority of American courts today likewise remain unwilling
or unable to reject these contractually based interpretive rules and remedies
in order to ascertain the reasonable expectations of the parties in insurance
contract disputes. Instead of adopting Professor Keeton's "strong" "rights
at variance" doctrine of reasonable expectations, the vast majority of contemporary American courts instead have rediscovered-and have more
fully utilized-a growing number of contractually based reasonable expectations rights and remedies, including: (1) the doctrine of ambiguities; 218
(2) contract unconscionability and public policy issues;2 19 (3) equitable remedies such as waiver, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, election, and
contract reformation; 220 and (4) a number of additional interpretive rules
applied to standardized insurance contracts as contracts of adhesion. 2 1 Indeed, this contractually based approach in ascertaining the reasonable expectations of the parties has many similarities to, and creates the basic
underlying foundation for, the "weaker" Keeton doctrine of reasonable
expectations, which is based upon "denying the insurer any unconscionable
222
advantage in an insurance contract."
A realistic consensus approach to the insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations therefore provides a number of well-established contractual parameters for allowing judicial discretion, when justice and equity
requires it, to recognize and honor the reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage in insurance contract disputes that are supplemental torather than at variance with-the terms of the parties' insurance contract.
214. See supra notes 8-10 and 150-58 and accompanying text.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 111-27 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20-52 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
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A contractually based doctrine of reasonable expectations also serves as an
interpretive shield as well as a sword to the insured policyholder since, as
Professor Eric Mills Holmes aptly observes:
Finally, any rule of law can be used offensively as well as defensively. Although
[few] opinions have addressed this issue, an insurance carrier (in an appropriate
set of objective circumstances) could assert the [insurance law doctrine of reasonable expectations] defensively by alleging that no reasonable person would
objectively expect insurance coverage. 23

If the current trend continues to develop where insurance companies are
prepared to litigate with their policyholders over insurance coverage disputes in ever-increasing numbers, 2 4 including a number of alleged "opportunistic breaches" by various insurance companies,"2 5 then a fortiori an
insured policyholder truly needs these protective contractual rights and
remedies, when justice and equity require it, in order to recognize and
validate the policyholder's reasonable expectation to coverage when it is at
variance with the insurance policy language.

223. HOLMEs' APPLEMAN ON INsuRANcE LAW, supra note 1, § 8.6 at 421. See also supra note
17 and accompanying text. Professor Keeton also recognized this important corollary to the
doctrine of reasonable expectations: "Several precedents among the small body of cases already decided make the point that this new doctrine is no guarantee of victory for a plaintiff
against the insurer, and may even be used affirmatively by any insurer in defense against
claims that are beyond reasonable expectations." Keeton, Reasonable Expectations,supra note
1, at 279-80 (footnotes omitted).
224. See, e.g., Leslie Scism, Tight-Fisted Insurers Fight Their Customers to Limit Big Awards,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1996, at Al (stating that, according to the American Insurance
Association, "insurers spend (conservatively) a billion dollars a year in so-called coverage
litigation.").
225. See Anderson and Fournier, supra note 1, at 377-85; see also Bob Works, Excusing
Nonoccurrence of Insurance Policy Conditionsin Orderto Avoid DisproportionateForfeiture:ClaimsMade Formats as a Test Case, 5 CoNNs'. INs. LJ. 505 (1998-99).
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